
ECOWAS REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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“The general view was that setting up a subregional cooperation entity in West Africa that cuts across differences in language, culture and the relative size and economic strengths was an idea whose time had come. And this seal was put on the determination to end the centuries of division and artificial barriers imposed on the people of West Africa from outside”.

*Prof. Adebayo Adedeji¹,
often called “Father of the ECOWAS”*

“La mission historique de l’Afrique occidentale consiste donc, dans une large mesure, à profiter des facilités que lui donne l’histoire pour devenir sans délai un Etat fédéré puissant...”

Prof. Cheikh Anta Diop²

“Si la CEDEAO no existiese, habría que inventarla”³

*Phrase repeated by different actors
–AFD, DFID, etc.– y de la CEDEAO in Abuja*

¹ *History and prospects for regional integration in Africa. The Third Meeting of the African Development Forum. Addis Ababa, 5 March 2002*

² *Les Fondements Économiques et Culturels d’un État Fédéral d’Afrique Noire. Ed. Présence Africaine, 1974*

³ *“If ECOWAS did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it”*

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS:

AECID	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFD	French Agency for Development
AfricaRice	Africa Rice Centre
BCEAO	Central Bank of West African States
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CDP	Community Development Programme
CET	Common External Tariff
CILSS	Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CORAF/WECARD-	West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
EC	European Commission
ECOWADF	ECOWAS Fund for Agricultural Development
ECOWAP	ECOWAS Agricultural Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
ECREEE	ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
EDF	European Development Fund
EEEE	ECOWAS Energy Efficiency Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EREF	ECOWAS Renewable Energy Facility
EREI	ECOWAS Renewable Energy Investment Initiative
EREP	ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy
ERERA	ECOWAS Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority
ETLS	ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme
FAO	United Nations' Organization for Food and Agriculture
FODETE	Fund for Development and Financing for Transport and Energy
GAfsp	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GFRP	Global Food Crisis Response Program
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFDC	International Fertilizer Development Centre
ITF	EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
IWMI	International Water Management Institute
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MS	Member States
NAIP	National Agriculture Investment Plan
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	Official Development Aid
PEPAD	EPA's Programme for Development
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PPDU	Project Planning and Development Unit
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RAAF	ECOWAS Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food
RAIP	Regional Agricultural Investment Plan
RE	Renewable energy
RIP	Regional Indicative Programmes
RISP	Regional Integration Support Programme
ROPFA	Network of Farmers' and Producers' Associations of West Africa
SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club
TFP	Technical and Financial Partners
WAAP	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Programme
WADB	West African Development Bank
WAPP	West Africa Power Pool
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WRCU	Water Resources Coordination Unit
WB	World Bank

I.- INTRODUCTION

I.1.- RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Spain and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) made their strategic collaboration official in the year 2005, by signing a *Memorandum of Understanding*. In 2007, both institutions agreed to create the Spain-ECOWAS Fund on Migration and Development. In 2009, in Abuja (Nigeria) the Summit Spain-ECOWAS took place, in which various regional cooperation programmes in different sectors were endorsed in the final Declaration. Both the previous Spanish Development Cooperation Master Plan (2009-2012) as well as the current one (2013-2016) designate Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially its Western region, as a geographical priority area, in which the ECOWAS plays a key role in the ongoing processes of sustainable development and regional integration.

According to this prioritization of the region by Spain's development policy, which has resulted in different programmes over the last few years, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) considers that it is necessary to improve the knowledge of the economic and political integration processes at the ECOWAS, especially on those sectors where AECID's support focuses, namely agriculture and food security, renewable energy and power connectivity and infrastructure.

With regards to these sectors, in the annexes to the full version of this report, the key issues related to the appropriation of and alignment with the regional strategies by the countries prioritized by Spain's Development Cooperation Policy (Senegal, Mali and Niger), as well as those considered to be of special importance for Spain in the region (Nigeria, Ghana, Cabo Verde and Burkina Faso), can be found.

In the last section of this report we cover the progress made and the obstacles raised in the regional integration processes, with special focus on the above mentioned three sectors, as well as describe the main features of the EU policies and their impact on the regional integration dynamics taking place at the ECOWAS in terms of trade, finance and development.

The information to write this report has been collected from different primary and secondary sources and from interviews conducted with key actors and informants during the fieldwork conducted in Abuja and Brussels.

1.2. CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES

The ECOWAS is currently made up of 15 countries¹. The organization was created in 1975 (by the Treaty of Lagos) with the aim of promoting economic cooperation and integration and regional security. Cabo Verde joined in 1976 and Mauritania left the organization in the year 2000. The ECOWAS agenda for regional integration was pushed forward significantly after signing the Treaty of Abuja (1991), which creates the African Economic Community.

In 1993 the Treaty of Lagos was ratified, in order to advance towards the adoption of a common external tariff (CET) and the principle of solidarity between member states was introduced. The four stages planned in the process of regional integration consist of the creation of a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market and, finally, an Economic and Monetary Union.

West Africa is the region which ranks lower in the world in all human development indicators. 13 ECOWAS member countries were classified in 2013 under UNDP's Low Human Development category and 60% of the region's population is estimated to live with less than one dollar a day². However, many of these countries are known to be rich in natural resources. Due mostly to the rising prices of minerals and oil, over the last few years the GDP growth rates in the region have been very high (for instance, in 2012 Niger's GDP increased by 11%, Ghana's by 7.5%, Ivory Coast's by 8.2% and Sierra Leone's by 20%). This economic growth has come hand in hand with a similar increase in social inequality all throughout the region².

The progress made in the regional integration process has been strongly hindered by political instability and the conflicts that have peppered the most recent history of this region (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea), which have had an obvious socio-economic impact and led to the displacement of millions.

Despite certain advancements in different fields, which we will describe later in this report, there are still numerous deficits and challenges to progress in the regional integration process. One key issue, pointed out by the ECOWAS itself, has been the lack of appropriation by the Member States (MS). Aiming at getting all MS actively involved in the process of regional integration, in 1982 the ECOWAS Council of Ministers recommended the creation of a National Cell in each of the MS that would be in charge of promoting ECOWAS's activities and pushing integration.

The other major regional organization, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has achieved significant institutional progress with the creation of a customs union (with a CET established in 1997 that became active in the year 2000), a multilateral supervisory mechanism for macro-economic policies and a funding facility drawn from its own resources³.

¹ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The organization's website is: <http://www.ecowas.int>

² ECOWAS Community Development Programme, Concept Note.

³ WAEMU member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The organization's website is: <http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Home.aspx>

The ECOWAS and the WAEMU have agreed on a joint strategy to speed up the process of integration in West Africa, which is not free from obstacles, as we will see throughout this report.

2.- SUPPORT FROM SPAIN'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY TO THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESS IN WEST AFRICA

2.1.- PROGRAMMATIC INSTRUMENTS AND AGREEMENTS

From a historical perspective, the track record of Spain's Development Cooperation Policy in West Africa is quite shorter than that of other European countries (such as France and Britain), though from the beginning of the 21st century diplomatic relations with the region, both at a bilateral and at a regional level, have been intensified for a number of reasons⁴. The support of Spain's Development Cooperation Policy to the processes of regional integration in Africa- and particularly in West Africa- must be placed in the context of closer relations with the States in the region, which face common challenges, and it is chiefly expressed through Spain's appropriation of and alignment with the European Union's Development Policy and its support to the integration of the different regional blocks.

A **Memorandum of Understanding** between Spain and the then ECOWAS Executive Secretariat was signed in December 2005, which institutionalizes the cooperation between both entities, setting up a number of prioritized sectors and reaching an agreement on different commitments⁵. During the period covered by the Second Spanish Development Cooperation Master Plan (2005-2008), Spain contributed the amount of 250,000 Euros to the Small Arms Control Programme and made a voluntary contribution to the ECOWAS for 85,000 Euros (2006); the Spain-ECOWAS Fund for Migration and Development was created in 2008, with a contribution of 10 million Euros (which clearly shows the importance given to migration issues) and a satellite office of the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development opened at Spain's Embassy in Abuja, in order to facilitate cooperation relations with the ECOWAS.

This focus on regional integration and the increasing support to the ECOWAS are also present in later programmatic documents, such as the **Third Spanish Development Cooperation**

⁴ Amongst them, geographical proximity, but above all, the existence of common challenges related to security issues, especially to migration flows. Besides, from the beginning of the 21st century, the weight of Africa in the international political agenda is on the rise, not only in the field of development, but also in those of peacebuilding and security; Spain has thus broadened its actions, as its international commitments demanded.

⁵ This is the case of Spain's support to the Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) which took the form of a contribution of 750,000 Euros; the collaboration on training courses and seminars for technical management staff, the support given to the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre, headquartered in Accra and the coordinated effort in migration policies aimed at fighting all kinds of illicit traffic.

Master Plan (2009-2012) and the Second Africa Plan (2009-2012). West Africa is considered a priority region- according to AECID's data, **official development aid (ODA) geared to the region between 2006 and 2012 exceeded 900 million Euros⁶-** and a plan for regional cooperation is designed, with a multilateral approach (ECOWAS) and a bilateral approach focusing on fragile States or post-conflict situations.

The second milestone in the relations between Spain and the ECOWAS was, as stated before, the 2009 Special Summit of Abuja, where the **Joint Declaration between the 15 ECOWAS Heads of State and Government and the Spanish Government** was signed. This Declaration comprises specific commitments in different fields:

- a) Democratic Governance and institutional development
- b) Public policies to reach the MDGs: support to the regional agricultural policy, gender equality and public health actions...
- c) Infrastructure and energy: support to set up the ECOWAS Project Planning and Development Unit (PPDU) and the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)
- d) Other investment, trade and tourism; with a special reference to the promotion of partnerships between African and Spanish corporates.

The **current Master Plan (2013-2016)** makes the **improvement in the implementation of the regional programmes of Spain's Development Cooperation Policy⁷** one of its key elements. Regional integration is considered a useful tool not only to fight poverty and to reach the development goals, but also to promote the aid effectiveness agenda, to consolidate management structures for the Government institutions of Member States and to promote cooperation between States and the exchange of experiences and good practices. Along this line, the Fourth Master Plan states the wish of Spain **to intensify its support to regional programmes**. It is worth mentioning that the ECOWAS is the only African regional integration organization that is referred to by its name in the whole document, which clearly reflects the importance attached by Spain to this institution. According to the Department for Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa at AECID, the Managing Council has already taken the decision to open an Office for Technical Cooperation in Abuja.

2.2.- MAIN INITIATIVES TAKEN BY SPAIN TO SUPPORT THE ECOWAS

Prior to the Abuja Declaration, Spain already had a relevant cooperation relation with the ECOWAS, coming from the Memorandum signed in 2005. In 2008, Spain contributed 10 million Euros to the Spain-ECOWAS Fund for Migration and Development and, in that year, Spain promoted the creation of a funding facility for business incubators through the Spain-NEPAD Fund, in order to empower African women (BIAWE-Business Incubator for African

⁶ According to our own estimates elaborated from data offered by AECID, net ODA flows to the region went beyond the 1 billion Euros mark.

⁷ MAEC-AECID (2013) *Plan Director 2013-2016*, p.41.

Women Entrepreneur). It focused initially on COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) member States and it was later extended to include the ECOWAS countries, contributing 1 million Euros through the ECOWAS Commission.

As a result of the commitments assumed in the Abuja Declaration, Spain's cooperation with the ECOWAS intensified from 2009. As we have already stated, Spain pledged to support the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the Regional Offensive for Food Production and Against Hunger, through a contribution of 240 million Euros in three years (2009-2011). With this commitment, Spain became the first source of funding for the region's agricultural sector and, after the International Conference on Funding for ECOWAP (2009) Spain was appointed **leading country of its technical and financial partners.**

- In **2009** Spain channelled its support to ECOWAP through two **contributions to two World Bank programmes.** Firstly, Spain contributed 80 million Euros to the **Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP)**, which was created in 2008 to fight the food crisis and to improve long-term resilience, supporting food prices and market stabilization, safety nets and family farming. Several projects were funded in West Africa: in Senegal (worth 20 mio.USD), Guinea (10 mio. USD), Liberia (10 mio. USD), Sierra Leone (10 mio. USD), Benin (9 mio. USD), Niger (7 mio. USD), Togo (7 mio. USD), Guinea-Bissau (5 mio. USD) and Mali (5 mio.USD). The World Bank reports show a positive impact which consisted of an improvement on food security and resilience, pointing out that 95% of the funds went to countries considered to be “vulnerable” or “very vulnerable”⁸. Thus, Spain's contribution would have made possible those projects that improved food security and increased the resilience of the above mentioned West African countries.
- -The second World Bank programme that received Spain's funding, was the **Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)**, to which a 70 mio. Euros contribution was made, allocated to the public sector funding window⁹. Spain, along with the US, promoted the creation of this multi-donor fund within the L'Aquila Declaration (2009) framework. One of the pledges of the L'Aquila Initiative for Food Security was to support the NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which explains why 11 out of 18 countries which have benefitted from GAFSP, are African. For West Africa, projects were approved in Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia, Senegal, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo, for a total amount of 310.8 mio. Euros between 2010 and 2013. The vast majority of these projects supported national agriculture investment plans under the regional policy, so that it can be said that Spain's contribution to this Fund had a clearly positive impact in terms of policy alignment.
- **Also, in 2009 Spain fulfilled its commitment concerning the ECREEE (headquartered in Praia, Cabo Verde)**, through a multi-annual contribution of 7 mio. Euros. In 2011 Spain funded a technical assistance consisting of hiring an external consultant to support the Director of the ECREEE and a few of its departments. Spain, through the

⁸ According to the Vulnerability Categorization Index developed by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).

⁹ According to ODA's data for 2009, out of the 70 mio. Euros contributed to GAFSP, 56 mio. Euros were tagged as “Africa undetermined” and the remaining 14 million as “PVD NE” (developing countries, not specified).

above mentioned contribution, became one of the leading supporters for the creation and development of the ECREEE, supporting its capacity building and, on the other hand, funding some strategic activities for the region, such as promoting private investment, kick-starting the **ECOWAS Observatory for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, or launching the ECOWAS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Facility (EREF)**.

- Additionally, in 2009 a contribution of 21,975 Euros was made to follow-up and strengthen cooperation with ECOWAS; 635,000 Euros went to the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP); 500,000 Euros to kick-start a regional programme to research malaria and to train doctors, through its support to the Malaria Research and Training Centre at Bamako University, in Mali; and 200,000 Euros, tagged as a contribution of multi-donor ODA, went to ECOWAS.
- **In 2010, through the FAD Cooperación Fund, 5 mio. Euros were allocated to the ECOWAS PPDU and disbursed the following year.** However, this Unit (created in 2005), which is in charge of infrastructure, is not yet fully operational.¹⁰ If this support went through, AECID would be, for the time being, the only Government aid agency supporting the PPDU and the Infrastructure Fund.
- **In 2010 Spain set up the Spain-IFAD Food Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund**, pledging 300 mio. Euros through a blending scheme¹¹ (285.5 mio. Euros as a loan from the Government of Spain and 14.5 million as a donation). In West Africa, projects in Cabo Verde (7.10 mio. Euros), Niger (14 mio. Euros) and Senegal (7 mio. Euros) were funded.¹²
- In order to fulfill the pledges that had been made, a 5 mio. Euros contribution to support the **ECOWAS Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food Security (RAAF)** was approved in the first FONPRODE 2011 Call for Proposals. The action was structured along two axes (both axes are closely intertwined, so that the second one can only work at its best if the first one does). The first axis will consist of **supporting the creation of the RAAF**¹³, through funding the cost of employing 3 people, furnishing its offices and running costs for the first two years¹⁴. This action will be complementary of those carried out by

¹⁰ At the time when fieldwork for this report was conducted in Abuja (March 2014), most of the staff recruited for the PPDU had not officially started at their new jobs yet. This delay has made Spain consider a different allocation of the budgeted funds (ECREEE being one of its potential beneficiaries). On the other hand, the ECOWAS Commission has guaranteed that the PPDU would be fully operational in March 2014.

¹¹ The innovative mechanism of the Spain-IFAD Food Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund can be made into an example of how to improve aid quality and efficiency, extracting valuable lessons from Spain's experience. For more information, see: Albala, M.A. (2012), *Una aplicación del blending a la financiación del desarrollo desde la eficacia de la ayuda: el caso de la Facilidad España-FIDA, en La cooperación financiera en España, Enero-Febrero 2012, n°864. ICE:*

http://www.revistasice.com/CachePDF/ICE_864_85-100__75C7855CB295F9F6258FEA7C6375024E.pdf

¹² IFAD (2012) Progress report. Spanish Food Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund. P.3:

<https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/107/docs/EB-2012-107-R-27.pdf>

¹³ The RAAF, created in 2011, was officially opened in September 27, 2013 in Lome (Togo).

¹⁴ In November 2008 the ECOWAS Council of Ministers forbade all ECOWAS institutions to hire their own staff and to pay their salaries from their own resources.

other partners such as USAID or the FAO. The second axis will support **kick-starting the social safety nets**, which is one of the results foreseen in part 3 of the Regional Agricultural Investment Programme (RAIP), aimed at reducing food insecurity and improving access to food for the most vulnerable. **This action is driven by Spain's Development Cooperation Policy focus on resilience.**

- In addition, in December 2010 Spain approved a 3 mio. Euro contribution to a **project, developed by the FAO, supporting the ECOWAS to implement the RAIP and to assist the MS when implementing their National Agriculture Investment Programmes (NAIP)**. In 2011 Spain supported the **ECOWAS capacity building** contributing 1 mio. Euros to the Pool Fund created by donors for the ECOWAS Capacity Building Programme. In 2013 the EU announced it would support the **Regional Food Security Reserve**, through a 56 mio. Euros project funded by the 10th EDF. Even though the necessary agreements and contracts have not been signed yet, the agencies implementing the project, via **delegated cooperation**, are the **French Agency for Development (AFD) and AECID**, which will bring, for the latter, an interesting experience of joint work with and learning from the French Agency, which has quite a long track record in the region.
- It is also necessary to remark that on the occasion of AECID's 25th anniversary in November 2013, the Agency, along with Intermón Oxfam, organized the seminar **"From vulnerability to overcoming the crises: community resilience"**. High-level experts, CSO representatives- especially from Africa- and different AECID's partners, among them the ECOWAS, participated in this event.
- In March 28, 2014, within the framework of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government Summit, a **Memorandum of Understanding to define Spain's support to the Regional Agricultural Policy in West Africa** was signed, determining the allocation of the 5 mio. Euros donated by Spain.

3.-APPROPRIATION AND ALIGNMENT OF THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN SECTORS AND COUNTRIES PRIORITIZED BY SPAIN'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY

In this section we will go through the main features defining the current status of regional policies in those sectors which have been marked as priorities by Spain's Development Cooperation Policy (agriculture and food security; renewable energy and power connectivity and infrastructure).

3.1. CURRENT SITUATION OF THE ECOWAS REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN SECTORS PRIORITIZED BY SPAIN'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY

3.1.1 AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

The development of agriculture in West Africa is a key issue to achieve food security. Agriculture employs 60-65% of the region's population, contributes 35% of regional GDP (reaching 60% in some States) and produces 15.3% of exported goods and services. Most of the farms are small and family owned - or communal – and women play a key role in the development and food security of their communities. West Africa agriculture faces great challenges, such as the effects of climate change, soil degradation and land grabbing. To these, we can add population growth, which has caused that due to low productivity, food supply is not enough to meet the existing demand. Agriculture is one of the priority areas of intervention according to the 1975 Treaty of Lagos. Together with food security, it is one of the eight areas of intervention outlined in the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty.

- **From the year 2000 West Africa has pushed a political dialogue process aimed at creating a single regional Agricultural Policy**, within a context where many sub-regional institutions coexist. The WAEMU adopted its own agricultural policy (WAP) in 2001¹⁵, with a strong food security bias. In this period, the negotiations to create **NEPAD's CAADP** start, which comes up as a process and a tool to improve the African

¹⁵ For more information about the WAP, see: UEMOA (2011) *Initiatives de la Commission de l'UEMOA en matière de sécurité alimentaire, de peuplement et de marché* ; <http://www.oecd.org/fr/csao/perspectivesouest-africaines/47427488.pdf>

agriculture and to transform it into a growth engine for the continent. In the year 2001, the FAO boosted the process organizing a workshop about the role of agriculture in the newly created NEPAD, which two years later would originate the CAADP **Action Plan**, elaborated by the FAO and the NEPAD's Secretariat (approved in 2003 by the African Union's Assembly in Maputo). The **Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa** was also approved during that assembly, which brought a strong political support for the CAADP and its Action Plan. The Heads of State and Government decided that the States should allocate 10% of their national budgets to agriculture, setting up a target of 6% of annual growth for this sector. The Maputo Declaration also insisted on the importance of supporting small farmers – most of whom are women – as well as the most vulnerable segments of the population.

– **The consultation process to kick-start the CAADP also focused on the Regional Economic Communities.** Profiting from the CAADP's momentum and its growing central role in the international agenda, in 2002 the Heads of State and Government mandated ECOWAS to coordinate and monitor the kick-start of the CAADP in West Africa. The **ECOWAS decided to place its future Regional Agricultural Policy, ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), within the CAADP framework, instead of creating a parallel process, which favoured its appropriation at the regional level**¹⁶. Finally, in January 2005 the **ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the ECOWAP**, thus having pioneered the regional implementation of the CAADP. The ECOWAP relies upon one main goal and seven specific ones, such as it is laid out in the following chart¹⁷

CHART 1.- ECOWAP, MAIN AND SPECIFIC GOALS

ECOWAP: MAIN GOAL AND SPECIFIC GOALS

MAIN GOAL:	SPECIFIC GOALS:
To contribute in a sustainable way to meet the food needs of the population, to the social and economic development and to the reduction of poverty in the Member States and of inequalities between territories, areas and countries.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1-The population's food security 2-To reduce food dependency under a food sovereignty approach 3-The integration of producers in the markets 4-To create jobs that guarantee family income and at the same time improve living conditions and services in the rural areas 5-To intensify production systems 6-To reduce the vulnerability of West Africa economies, limiting instability and regional insecurity 7-To adopt adequate funding mechanisms

– Afterwards, in **May 2005, the ECOWAS elaborated the ECOWAP Action Plan/ CAADP for the period 2006-2010**, aiming at building up a global and coherent framework in which the ECOWAS would play a coordinating role and would accelerate

¹⁶ Haggblade, S. et al. (2012) *Regional Dimensions of South Africa's CAADP Process: Lessons from West Africa (Draft)*. p. 8.

¹⁷ For more information on the ECOWAP, see : CEDEAO (2008) *La politique agricole régionale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest: l'ECOWAP. Faire de l'agriculture le levier de l'intégration régionale*, p.9: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/01_ComCEDEAO.pdf

synergies among various existing institutions¹⁸. **In later documents, the ECOWAS 19 reorganized the action lines contained in the above mentioned Action Plan, looking for synergies with the CAADP four pillars.** Thus, the ECOWAP will be implemented through national plans and a regional plan, which will revolve around 6 key issues: 1) Improvement of water management; 2) Improvement of other natural resources' management; 3) Sustainable development of farms; 4) Development of the agricultural sectors and market promotion; 5) Prevention and management of food crises and natural risks and 6) Capacity building – which specifically involves integrating gender equality.

- **In the context of the 2007-2008 food crisis**, caused by the worldwide increase in food prices, the **ECOWAS Heads of State and Government** adopted the **“Regional Offensive for Food Production and Against Hunger”** to respond effectively to the crisis situation (increasing food production, improving market dynamics and making access to food easier for the most vulnerable) and to produce long term action mechanisms through the ECOWAP programmes. **The crisis sped up the start of the ECOWAP**, involving the Commission and the States in order to develop emergency programmes. The “Offensive” led to a review of the ECOWAP intervention priorities, looking to improve coherence and harmonization at State and regional levels, and to the planning of **3 Mobilizing Programmes**, which should in turn originate federated initiatives in order to tackle the most pressing issues at the regional level. The preparation of these programmes was assigned to sub-regional specialized organizations.
- **In November 2009**, at the International Conference on Financing Regional Agricultural Policy in West Africa which took place in Abuja, the **Regional Partnership Compact for the Implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP** was signed and the Mobilizing Programmes were approved. After signing the Pact, **the process of regional planning and the negotiation process with each of the States to elaborate the NAIP started.** The ECOWAS coordinated the planning and design of the NAIP through the support given to the 15 Member States.

The RAIP has an estimated cost of 900 mio. USD of which the ECOWAS has pledged 15 mio. USD from its own coffers. Its 3 Mobilizing Programmes are: a) Promoting strategic sectors for food security, focusing on intensive farming (399 mio. USD); b) Promoting a favourable environment for the region's agricultural development (238 mio. USD); and c) Reducing food vulnerability and promoting stable and sustainable access to food (176 mio. USD)

The process continued after the Ministers' Committee meeting that took place in Accra in February 2011, which set up a series of priorities that would respond to the expectations generated at national and regional level. Among those priorities was creating the **RAAF**, the Regional Fund for Agriculture Development (ECOWADF), which would be hosted by the EBID; the Consultative Committee for Agriculture and Food and the Inter-departmental

¹⁸ For more information about this Plan, see: CEDEAO (2005) *Plan d'actions régional 2005-2010 pour la mise en oeuvre de la Politique Agricole de la CEDEAO (ECOWAP) et du PDDAA/NEPAD en Afrique de l'Ouest* : http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/nepad_ce-deao_ecowap_pddaa_plan_actions_2006_2010_version_juin_05.pdf

¹⁹ CEDEAO (2008) *La politique agricole régionale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest: l'ECOWAP. Faire de l'agriculture le levier de l'intégration régionale*. p. 11.

Coordination Committee²⁰.

The issue of the ECOWAP funding was broached too, at both regional and national level, asking the technical and financial partners to fulfill all the commitments they had made in L'Aquila²¹. The importance of the ECOWAS policy coherence was also underlined with the preferred adoption (in the context of the CET negotiations) of adapted agricultural tariffs and of policy measures aimed at reducing the regional impact of price volatility in the global food markets.

- **The RAAF was created in 2011²²** and officially opened in September 27, 2013 in Lome (Togo), where it will be located. It has been created as a financially independent technical institution, which reports to the Agriculture Commissioner and has been mandated to kick-start the regional programmes as well as to implement the regional investment plan. Its mission will consist of: a) to strengthen the Commission's - and especially those of the Agriculture Department- capacities to take part in the implementation of the investment programmes, strategic planning, rulemaking and management; b) to coordinate the activities of the technical institutions specialized on agriculture and agribusiness; c) to contribute to build up the capacities of the regional actors in terms of proposal writing and activity implementation.
- **The Regional Fund for Agricultural Development (ECOWADF) was created at the same time as the RAAF²³.** This Fund – which works as an independent entity within the EBID and is supervised by the Agriculture Commissioner – will secure the necessary funding for the regional investment programme and will complement the national funding mechanisms foreseen by the Member states for their NAIP. When the Fund was created, the ECOWAS contributed 38 mio. USD from its equity funds.

The Fund's resources will be made up of grants (from the ECOWAS, Financial and Technical Partners – FTPs, private sector), a Guaranty Fund (funded by the ECOWAS Commission, TFPs, foundations, financial institutions and MS through the co-financing of programmes), bank credit facilities and direct contributions from the private sector. **These resources will be able to fund actions through four windows:** a) regional integration, b) food security, c) innovation and capacity building, d) support to the political, institutional and regulatory regional management structures.

²⁰ ECOWAS (2012) *Memorandum on the assessment of activities carried out in 2011-2012 and work prospects for 2013-2015*. Department of Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources;
http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/Memorandum_Ecowap_2013-2015_EN.pdf

²¹ It is worth mentioning that during the Dakar Business Meeting most donors avoided making any formal pledges for funding, issuing ambiguous statements about their intentions to give support and without making any specific promises. It must be all considered in a context of economic crisis with its logical restrictions.

²² *Reglement c/Reg.1/08/11 portant creation de l'Agence Regionale pour l'Agriculture et l'Alimentation (ARAA)*. Soixante Sixieme Session Ordinaire du Conseil des Ministres. Abuja, le 17 - 19 août 2011.

²³ *Reglement c/Reg.2/08/11 portant creation d'un Fonds Regional pour l'Agriculture et l'Alimentation*. Sixieme Session Ordinaire du Conseil des Ministres. Abuja, le 17 - 19 août 2011.

- **The Regional Food Security Reserve was created in February 2013²⁴.** According to the detailed feasibility study – made in 2012 with the participation of all main national and regional stakeholders – its goal will be to respond effectively to the region’s food crisis, thus helping to implement the ECOWAP, under a food security and regional security approach. The regional reserve would serve as a third defence line, complementing proximity stocks and national reserves at the MS.

For that purpose, there will be a Regional Network of Food Security Stocks (**RESOGEST**), managed at the technical level by the CILSS which will be a link to the regional reserve and will facilitate national appropriation.

- **In September 2013** a meeting of ECOWAS Agriculture Ministers took place in Lome, in which **the RAIP’s and NAIP’s main results were reviewed** along with **some issues about the ECOWAP’s operability²⁵**, of which it is worth mentioning the following:
 - In the field of **agricultural intensification** (RAIP’s Objective 1), the main actions were the implementation of programmes such as the WAAP-West Africa Agricultural Productivity Programme (funded by CORAF/WECARD and WB), the seed programme (implemented by the IFDC and funded by USAID), the fertilizer programme (implemented by the IFDC and funded by the Netherlands and USAID), the ECOAGRIS pilot phase (funded by the EU) and the programme to promote livestock farming value chains and their products.
 - In the field of **promoting and enabling a favourable global environment for agricultural development** (RAIP’s Objective 2), the following programmes were initiated: Market Regulation Programme, Fruit Fly Control Programme (funded by the EU and France), Programme for the Promotion of Trade and Agribusiness (funded by USAID) and the project of setting up a regional fertilizer market²⁶. It is worth mentioning that the **Department of Agriculture took part in the process leading to the reclassification of the agricultural products in the different tariff bands of ECOWAS common external tariff (CET)**, which at the time was still being prepared.
 - In the field of **improving access to food to the vulnerable populations** (RAIP’s Objective 3), the Commission created the **Regional Food Reserve** and adopted the **Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management** (see Chart 2) and the **Zero Hunger Initiative** (see Chart 3). They also finalised the **Social Safety Nets Programme** and continued developing the Climate Change Programme and the West Africa Food Security Programme (supported by Sweden and France). They also mentioned the launch of the RAAF (which had been funded by USAID and Spain), as well as the collaboration between the ECOWAS and other regional institutions and socio-professional organizations, among them the **AGIR** (see Chart 4), the **Offensive on Rice Production**, or the Regional Agricultural Information System ECOAGRIS. Besides, they kick-started the

²⁴ Acte Additionnel a /Sa.2/02/13 relatif à la creation de la Reserve Regionale de Sécurité Alimentaire de la Cedeao. Quarante-deuxieme Session Ordinaire de la Conference des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement. Yamoussoukro, 27 - 28 février 2013.

²⁵ See: http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/communique_final_lome_sept13_angl_.pdf

²⁶ They also launched other programmes such as the NAP-SPSO & Veterinary Governance (implemented by IBAR-International Bureau of Animal Resources and the AU), the aflatoxin management programme, or the Network for Inspection and Quality Control of Labs. They passed as well some regulations on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, vet products, biodiversity, etc...

implementation process for the Monitoring and Evaluation System, funded by the CAADP Multi-donor Fund, aimed at supporting the implementation of these systems at national and regional level.

CHART 2. THE CHARTER FOR FOOD CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

THE CHARTER FOR FOOD CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT²⁷

In February 1990, the CILSS member countries and the donor countries members of the Sahel Club adopted the “Food Aid Charter” which came out as a response to a proposal from the RPCA-Food Crises Prevention Network, with the goal of minimizing the potential adverse effects of food aid and of achieving its elimination in the long term. Between 2007 and 2011 they conducted a participatory review process aimed at adapting the Charter to the new context, renaming it “The Food Crises Prevention and Management Charter”, which is adopted in February 2012 by the ECOWAS member states, Mauritania and Chad. Guided by a series of principles based on human dignity and the Right to Food, the Charter intends to offer some best practices guidelines that allow all actors to offer effective aid in an efficient and coordinated way.

CHART 3. ZERO HUNGER INITIATIVE (ECOWAS)

ZERO HUNGER INITIATIVE²⁸

The ECOWAS Zero Hunger Initiative is launched in September 2012 with the goal of uniting governments, parliaments, civil society and producers’ organizations around a common goal: to eradicate Hunger by 2020 and to achieve significant progress by 2015. The Initiative takes a multi-sector approach to food security, given the inefficacy of partial approaches. The Initiative tries to sustain itself upon the existing programmes and policies in order to avoid duplicities, trying to reengineer those programmes by questioning their approach on food security and nutrition and to develop complementary initiatives where gaps are found. The ECOWAS has opened a dialogue with Brazil within the framework of the Centre of Excellence against Hunger (Brasilia) aimed at exchanging experiences, deepening knowledge and improving the “Zero Hunger” strategy.

CHART 4. AGIR – GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR RESILIENCE INITIATIVE- SAHEL (PROMOTED BY THE EU COMMISSION)

AGIR- GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR RESILIENCE INITIATIVE-SAHEL²⁹

The AGIR is promoted by the EU Commission, along with Governments, UN Agencies, and other humanitarian and development actors. It proposes a route map to improve humanitarian and development aid coordination in order to be able to reach the most vulnerable segments of the population, together with the implementation of policies in the Sahel and West Africa. It aims at improving the synergies, coherence and effectiveness of resilience actions implemented in the region. Led by the ECOWAS, the WAEMU and the CILSS, its main objective is to structurally reduce food and nutritional vulnerabilities, in order to reach the “Zero Hunger” goal in 20 years’ time.

²⁷ RPCA (2012) : *Charte pour la Prévention et la Gestion des Crises Alimentaires*
<http://www.oecd.org/fr/csao/publications/41281118.pdf>

²⁸ CEDEAO (2012) *Note d’orientation strategique. Vers une securité alimentaire de proximité en Afrique de l’Ouest : « Faim Zero en Afrique de l’Ouest »*. See : http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/Faim_Zero_FR.pdf

²⁹ *Alliance globale pour l’Initiative résilience - Sahel et Afrique de l’Ouest (AGIR). Déclaration commune. Ouagadougou, le 6 décembre 2012.*

- **As regards the implementation process of the NAIP, 14 out of 15 MS (except for Guinea Bissau) have completed the process up to the organisation of the Business Meeting.** According to the conclusions drawn at the Lome meeting, the NAIP elaboration and implementation process allowed to change the agricultural planning methodology and to improve the monitoring and evaluation processes, created room for multi-stakeholder dialogue, improved the involvement of the private sector in agricultural development, increased the government resources allocated to agriculture and improved production and productivity of certain crops. However, they also pointed at important challenges ahead, such as the poor performance of the NAIP coordination structures in some countries; the development of parallel initiatives; the insufficient consideration given to some emerging issues (such as nutrition, climate change, research, risk management or resilience); the weaknesses of the monitoring and evaluation systems; the difficulties to mobilize resources for NAIP implementation; the low level of capacities of non-state actors in order to follow-up the NAIP implementation better.

3.1.2 RENEWABLE ENERGY AND POWER CONNECTIVITY

As in many other parts of the world, improving the lives of Africa's population has a direct and growing relationship with improving and expanding access to electricity and the development of renewable energy (RE) sources. The link between the improvement of sustainable energy systems and that of basic social services (health, water and sanitation, education) is an issue of growing importance for international development cooperation and for donors (such as the EU) which, in addition, has a direct impact on the fields of agriculture and food security and on industry and trade growth. Around 550 million people in Africa have no access to electricity. The vast energy resources (from fossil fuels to RE) of Sub-Saharan Africa yield a power generation capacity equivalent to that of Spain only. In the case of West Africa, according to estimates, 175 million people (out of a total 300 millions) have no access to any type of energy source, 25% of whom live in urban areas and 75% in rural areas.

At the international level, the benchmark initiative is the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All)³⁰ sponsored by the UN General Secretary. **The 3 goals set for 2030 are to supply universal access to modern energy services; to duplicate the global ratio of energy efficiency; and to duplicate the weight of RE in the global energy mix.** All the ECOWAS countries take part in the SE4ALL initiative (which currently includes more than 80 countries).

3.1.2.1 REGIONAL FRAMEWORK AND INITIATIVES IN THE ECOWAS COUNTRIES ENERGY SECTOR

The existing gaps in terms of energy security and the multiple challenges in this field have captured the attention of the ECOWAS institutions and of the MS, especially from the eighties. The main references are as follows:

³⁰ See: <http://www.se4all.org>

- In December 1982 the **ECOWAS Energy Policy** was adopted and in 1989 they set up the basis to create a regional energy market. Later in 2003, the **Energy Protocol** was adopted and in 2006, the **Energy Generation and Transmission Master Plan**. The **West Africa Power Pool (WAPP)**³¹, headquartered in Cotonou (Benin) also dates from the same year. Its goal is to integrate the national capacities and power generation systems in a unified regional market, in order to boost economic development and **to offer an affordable, safe and stable energy supply to all citizens from the ECOWAS countries, by the year 2018**. The key for this is to develop regional projects of an adequate size and to carry out the necessary inter-connections among the transnational high voltage power grids of the ECOWAS countries, in order to make up for the existing gaps in those countries that have them. After being reviewed in 2011, the **WAPP Master Plan** foresees the development of a whole series of priority projects, **in order to duplicate the region's power generation capacity by 2025**. It also foresees an increase in the use of RE by that date, so that 36% of the ECOWAS total installed capacity would come from renewable energy sources (with 28% coming from big and medium sized hydroelectric power plant projects and 8% from other renewable energy sources). Also in 2006 and jointly with the WAEMU, they approved a **White Paper for a regional policy aimed at expanding access to energy supply for the rural and peri-urban population**, in order to reach the MDGs (the **ECOWAS/WAEMU White Paper**). Its main goal is to boost regional integration through coherent frameworks and programmes, to improve access to energy services and to reduce poverty. By 2015 at least 20% of the new investments on power generation for the rural areas should be based on RE sources.

- The next steps taken by the ECOWAS were the creation, in 2007, of the **Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERERA)**³², based in Accra (Ghana) and, in 2008 the already mentioned **Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)**³³, headquartered in Cabo Verde, which started its operation in 2010 supported by the Governments of Spain and Austria and with the technical assistance of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

- In July 2013 the Heads of State and Government approved the **ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP)** and the **ECOWAS Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP)**. AECID, UNIDO and the Global Environment Facility – Strategic Program for West Africa (GEF-SPWA, a joint initiative of the WB and UN) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) are currently supporting the EREP.

- Other initiatives aimed at the regional integration are based mostly on hydropower projects which have been implemented through the Inter-state Authorities such as the Senegal River Development Organization, the equivalent one for the Gambia River, the Volta River Authority or the one for the river Niger Basin.

³¹ See: <http://www.ecowapp.orgw>

³² See <http://www.erera.arrec.org>

³³ See <http://www.ecreee.org>

3.1.2.2 RENEWABLE ENERGY REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES

The ECREEE is part of the institutional structure of the ECOWAS and plays a key role for promoting and developing RE and energy efficiency at the regional level. Its main objectives are to boost sustainable development through a better access to modern energy services, energy security and climate change mitigation; apart from promoting the elaboration of an adequate framework for the development of regional services markets and ER technology, sustained on energy efficiency. The ECREEE is also in charge of coordinating all the ECOWAS member states' actions for the SE4All initiative.

As shown by many studies and research conducted on this topic³⁴, the scope for growth of RE in West Africa, especially in the case of the “new RE” (also known as “non-conventional” RE, such as wind power, biomass and small-scale hydropower) is very significant, since there are plenty of untapped or under-utilized water resources. According to the German International Cooperation agency (GIZ)³⁵, up to 64% of the ECOWAS regional RE related supply is covered by thermal power plants, 31% comes from hydropower plants (mainly from the big ones) and only 5% comes from other RE sources.

The most relevant features of the current phase of ongoing regional integration are the following:

- **The EREP is born out of the efforts made by the WAPP, the EMUWA and the CILSS.** The EREP is based on **five principles**: subsidiarity, participating approach, optimization of available resources, promotion of public-private partnerships and support to gender equality.

CHART 5. EREP'S MAIN OBJECTIVES

- To increase the percentage of RE (including big-scale hydropower) in the whole region by 35% in 2020 and by 48% in 2030.
- To increase the weight of the “new RE” in the region's energy mix by 10% (2,425 Mw) in 2020 and by 19% (7,606 Mw) in 2030.
- To supply electricity to 75% of the rural population (through power grids) and to the remaining 25% through RE supplied by mini-grids and hybrid autonomous systems, in the year 2030 (thus complying with the SE4All universal access goal), which would require the installation of 60,000 mini-grids by 2020 and 68,000 more between 2020 and 2030.
- Additionally, in 2020 all the ECOWAS population should have access to better cooking facilities, either through improved stoves or by replacing gas-oil with some other more modern fuel such as Liquefied Petroleum Gas. In 2030 around 50% of all health centres and 25% of the agro-food and hospitality industries should have thermal-solar systems to supply their hot water needs.

The EREP's main bet is on using those energy sources which cost less and to encourage the installation of mini-grids which are not connected to a general grid in order to improve

³⁴ Such as the report Prospects for the African Power Sector, IRENA, 2012; plus others listed in the Annex for bibliography and references to this paper.

³⁵ Renewable Energies in West Africa, GIZ, 2009.

power access in the rural areas. Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana already have very interesting projects for hybrid mini-grids. The EREP also aims at, among other goals, encouraging the creation of a competitive RE market in order to reduce the use of other polluting energy sources; increasing its RE capacity through big-scale projects and encouraging private investment on RE. At present, all the ECOWAS countries are approaching the issue of their RE National Policies and their implementation strategies and drafting their RE National Plans (for a 5 year period and budget according to this) aimed at complying with the EREP's objectives. All National Plans should be finalised by the end of 2014.

- The ECREEE is also in charge of coordinating all activities related to the implementation of the **Renewables Readiness Assessments (RRAs)**; for the 11 ECOWAS countries which have not yet started this exercise which will let them identify the existing technological barriers and to come up with proposals to overcome them. This assessment has already been conducted for Senegal and is still ongoing for Ghana, Niger and The Gambia.
- **The WAPP's work is also determinant in order to move forward with regional integration.** The planned electricity regional market requires establishing a regional system that would allow live monitoring and control of the energy flows and which is directly connected to the national energy grids. The WAPP has decided to open this technical coordination centre in Cotonou (Benin).
- **The ERERA should also play a key role.** According to the EREP, the ERERA needs to develop its competencies on financial and economic issues and RE tariffs, among others. Besides, it needs to develop a close relationship with the country authorities in order to implement the national RE policies and to harmonize them at regional level. In 2013 the draft legislation to regulate tariffs and payments for the ECOWAS regional cross-border energy trade was validated.
- **In all this process we must take into account the big deficits the region presents on access to modern energy services.** Quite often the institutions, both public and private, have no capacity to design, implement and follow-up (which is key in a sector such as this, under constant change) the RE and energy efficiency policies and their regulations. These deficits exist also at a technical level, related to the capacity to conduct prior feasibility studies of a certain quality and the implementation of some projects and to the ability to develop a national production and manufacturing industry for the required technology elements. According to these deficits, the ECREEE is implementing a **Regional Capacity Building Programme** which addresses different issues related to RE and energy efficiency, with a special focus on gender equality experiences (in line with the ECOWAS programme to mainstream gender issues in access to energy), experience exchanges and knowledge from abroad.
- The ECREEE has planned different activities for 2014 for the regional promotion of different RE, including **small scale hydropower** (up to 30 Mw). The ECOWAS considers that this type of energy is key to meet the demand coming from urban and peri-urban areas and from isolated rural areas too. To that end, it is implementing a Small Scale Hydro Power Programme (SSHP), managed by the ECREEE in collaboration with the UNIDO. There are multiple barriers to the development of this small scale hydropower (institutional, financial, technical, due to lack of capacity, knowledge or awareness; which, on the other hand, are

not exclusive of the SSHP) which involve as many challenges to achieve the objectives of regional development and integration. Both the ECREEE and the different regional actors have also extracted a good number of lessons learned in this field which should contribute to improve the ongoing processes³⁶.

- **One of the main challenges for the development of the “new RE”** (also called “non-conventional RE”) **is the funding of the investment projects**, which have a high initial cost and require a long-term view and commitment. Having a more politically stable context and the necessary regulatory framework to guarantee law enforcement and investment incentives are key issues. Investment figures in RE as compared to global energy investment are well below their full potential, with a 5% investment on RE and a 3.5% coming from Independent Power Producers.

To address this issue, the ECREEE manages two programmes to support projects arising from all 15 ECOWAS countries, the already mentioned EREF (ECOWAS Renewable Energy Facility)³⁷ and EREI (ECOWAS Renewable Energy Investment Initiative)³⁸. Both programmes are developed within the framework of the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Investment and Business Promotion. The EREF is linked to the ECOWAS/WAEMU White Paper and it has been designed to get funding for about 200 projects and to support local manufacturers and service providers. It focuses on small and medium scale projects, mostly in rural and peri-urban areas. The EREI is the big pledge made by the ECOWAS to facilitate the construction of RE infrastructure in the region, lowering financial barriers to investment. It is geared at medium and big scale RE power plants and has the objective of supporting RE project implementation through the creation of a trading platform that links entrepreneurs to potential venture capitalists.

- On the other hand, given the great dependency on biomass consumption and the unsustainable use of natural resources, **efforts to improve the region’s bioenergy potential have doubled** through the distribution of stoves and the promotion of less polluting and more efficient fuels and the use of agro industrial waste (such as biogas or the production of energy from biomass).
- **Other relevant part of the regional integration process is the ECREEE’s Observatory**³⁹, whose objective is to overcome the existing information and knowledge gaps in the field of renewable energy. The Observatory has been created thanks to UNIDO’s⁴⁰ collaboration and it is supported by the Governments of Spain and Austria.

³⁶ *Energías renovables en África Occidental. Estado, experiencias y tendencias*. Vilar (Ed), 2012. M. Kappia y M. Lugmayr, p. 235.

³⁷ See <http://ecreee.vsl20081.hl-users.com/website/index.php?ecowas-renewable-energy-facility-eref>

³⁸ See <http://www.ecreee.org/page/ecowas-renewable-energy-investment-initiative-erei>

³⁹ See <http://www.ecreee.org/page/observatory-renewable-energy-and-energy-efficiency-ecowrex>

⁴⁰ Within the framework of the project Promoting Coordination, Coherence and Knowledge Management under Energy Component of the Strategic Program for West Africa.

3.2.3 INFRASTRUCTURE

In the case of regions such as West Africa, with countries and areas very isolated and small and scattered markets, the main objective for the creation of a regional infrastructure network (for transport, energy and telecommunications) is to create a supporting structure which, through different synergies and economies of scale, facilitates and boosts competitive and efficient regional markets.

- **At a continental level, the benchmark initiative is the NEPAD's and the AU's Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).** The Priority Action Plan is framed within the AU's Institutional Architecture for Infrastructure Development in Africa and comprises a series of projects in the West Africa region (initially up to 16), focusing mainly on energy and transport, given their potential for regional integration. **The ECOWAS has created a Project Planning and Development Unit (PPDU).** The Unit, which will eventually open in Lome (Togo) is still at a very early stage and its Director has just been recruited⁴¹.

PIDA's most relevant projects are the West African Power Transmission Corridor, the Sambangalou power dam, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Bamako Multimodal Corridor, the Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Multimodal Corridor and the Abidjan-Lagos Coastal Corridor⁴². The latter project would complement the main two regional motorways: the Dakar-Lagos highway and the Dakar-N'djamena one. In February 2014 China announced its support to ECOWAS regional and transnational infrastructure projects, pointing at a potential support for the construction of the Dakar-Lagos highway. Both parts had already signed an agreement to develop regional infrastructure back in 2012.

- **The WAPP infrastructure programme was established for the period 2005-2020** and it is sustained upon five parts: the Coastal Transmission Backbone; the Inter-zonal Transmission Hub; the OMVG/OMVS Power System Development; the North-core Transmission and the Ivory Coast-Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea power grid.
- Within the WAPP framework, **one of the benchmark projects that has already been implemented is the Inter-connection between the Nigerian Power Authority and the Benin Electricity Community** (which also supplies electricity to Togo), funded by the AfDB, the WADB and the ECOWAS. The project was finished in 2007 and has helped to supply energy to numerous rural areas in Togo and Benin, with positive impacts on agriculture. It has also solved supply problems in these two countries, mostly in relation to their energy imports from Ghana and Ivory Coast. It is considered a benchmark project for the WAPP regional integration process⁴³.

⁴¹ At the time of conducting the fieldwork for this report in Abuja (March 2014), the PPDU Director had not yet been formally appointed, though he had already started at the job.

⁴² The main features of these projects can be found at this website: <http://www.au-pida.org/node/206>

⁴³ See *Aid for Trade: case story; NEPA-CEB Interconnection Project, AfDB Group*. On the other hand, the most recent WAPP annual report (2012) lists all planned projects and some implemented actions, such as the inter-connection line between Ivory Coast and Mali.

- **Aside from the WAPP and its Master Plan, the most relevant transnational project in the region is the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP)**, a 681 Km long gas pipeline that departs from the Niger Delta region (Nigeria) to supply gas to Togo, Benin and Ghana. One of the project's objectives is to significantly reduce gas burning in the Niger Delta. The location of the WAGP in this region, with more than 30 million inhabitants, is far from being free from risks and tensions, given its decades-long history of very serious social and environmental impact. The WAGP has also experienced supply problems and difficulties to meet the required contract volumes and has never been exempt from political tensions.
- Given its impact on the economy, trade, production capacities and food security, **one of the ECOWAS regional priorities (and also of the EU policy for the region) focuses on developing and rebuilding the land transportation infrastructure**. Roads represent between 80 and 90% of transport infrastructure for goods and people and are essential for access to the rural areas.

Both the WAEMU/UEMOA and the ECOWAS have come up, each one of them, with a strategy and an action plan for the transport and road infrastructure and both share an inter-State programme (the Regional Inter-State Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme UEMOA/ECOWAS) to improve the road network and to reduce transportation costs. The costs of road transportation for goods in this region are the highest in the world.

The construction of motorway networks is one the priorities in the region, especially the “Trans-coastal” Lagos-Nouakchott and the “Trans-Sahelian” Dakar-N’djamena. Another joint programme shared by both organizations and the NEPAD aims at improving cross-border traffic (improving border controls, creating an observatory, inter-connecting computer systems) and to reduce its costs. There is also a legal and institutional framework aimed at harmonizing regulations and coordinating the management of the road transport system⁴⁴.

⁴⁴ See Emerging Issues in West Africa: Developments in Regional Integration in 2012, Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations, 2012.

4. PROGRESS AND HINDRANCES TO THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESS

Since its inception, the ECOWAS countries have made significant progress in the process of regional integration through its different constituents, even though major challenges still persist and there is wide scope for its development and consolidation. The Revised Treaty (1993) tried to revitalize the integration process. Since then, all regional integration policies and programmes have been geared towards a political and economic convergence, sustained mostly on the free circulation of people and goods, a Common Market, infrastructure development, the adoption of common essential policies and advancements on peace, democracy and good governance.

The ECOWAS has been characterized by obvious weaknesses at the time of applying the policies and protocols approved, inserting the regional policies and approaches into the national agendas and aligning them (that is, establishing the regional – national nexus and the appropriation at national level of regional programmes), and approving a regional reference framework that guides the coordination and implementation of the national development plans. This last issue has been addressed through the ECOWAS’ “Vision 2020”, which has come up with a Community Development Plan (CDP, still pending implementation) whose backbone is the development of common agriculture and industry policies, the inter-connection of transport, communications and energy infrastructures and the implementation of common natural resources and environmental policies. This Plan is the keystone upon which an essential part of the regional integration process and its different realities are to be sustained, enhancing the participation of the citizens and the private sector⁴⁵. To that end, the ECOWAS has developed a 2011-2015 Regional Strategic Plan which intends to be “a proactive mechanism for change”⁴⁶, and a Mid-term Regional Action Plan which establishes the programmes to be developed for each action area and their results and indicators⁴⁷.

On the other hand, one of the major challenges for the integration process is also linked to the new scenario in Sub-Saharan Africa that has emerged from the year 2000 after the arrival of China – whose foreign policy in the region is based on procuring commodities, especially minerals and oil – and other emerging powers (such as India or Brazil); whose bilateral agendas with the ECOWAS member states totally lack a regional approach, at least for the time being. This issue has significantly changed the geopolitical references in some sub-regions such as West Africa and has its reflection on the EU’s strategy, whose capacity to negotiate and political clout have been significantly reduced, mostly with regards to those ECOWAS

45 The Community Development Plan (CDP-ECOWAS) has 242 projects and/or programmes (72 of them are sponsored by the MS; 161 sponsored by different Inter-governmental organizations and 9 sponsored by non-state actors). The estimated global budget is 28.4 billion USD (7 of which have already been earmarked).

46 CEDEAO (2010) *Plan Strategique Regional 2011-2015*.

47 CEDEAO (2010) *Plan d’action Regional a Moyen Terme 2011-2015*.

countries rich in natural resources- and whose GDP has been growing exponentially over the last few years.

The sustained economic growth that the region has experienced since 2005 (with an average GDP growth rate of 6% for 2012), creates a favourable scenario for sustainable development provided that there is the necessary political will to impose that twist on the process. As we have already pointed out, this GDP growth has not been accompanied by equivalent improvements in terms of development, as can be easily deduced from the region's slow advancement in relation with the MDGs and, on the contrary, has increased social inequality.

What follows is an analysis of **the most relevant aspects of this process**, its progress and hindrances:

- **The conflicts and instability that have affected large swathes of the region for long periods, have been a determining hindrance to the progress of regional integration.** In 1999, the ECOWAS adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. The peace and security part has been cause for several actions, sending-in troops to different war scenarios as well as mediating to prevent conflict, with positive results in several cases
- The security threats that originate in the regional and state governance deficits are therefore one of the major challenges that the region faces. At present, there are different areas in the region affected by high levels of insecurity, tensions and conflict, such as the Sahel belt (Northern Mali and some part of Niger), Guinea-Bissau (which houses important criminal gangs linked to drug trafficking) and Northern Nigeria (with a violence shock-wave overflowing to other areas in the region). The Niger Delta (Nigeria) – which is the source of all the country's oil – is also the epicentre from where all the violence in the Gulf of Guinea comes from. The recent conflict in Mali has evidenced the limited logistics and operational capacities of its peace-keeping forces when the conflicts reach a significant degree of complexity.
- At the political level and as usual in any integration process, one of the main hindrances has been the MS' **resistance to relinquish their sovereignty in certain areas.** **The ECOWAS has shown clear deficits in terms of institutional and organizational capacity and circulation of information flows** – both internally and externally – which has limited its achievements in the integration process and the management and implementation of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The lack of technical capacity, the insufficient human resources, the slowness and inadequacy of internal procedures make harder and delay decision implementation and, therefore, hinder the development of different regional strategies. And this in spite of **the ECOWAS Commission itself having identified capacity building as one of the organization's most pressing needs.** In 2012, the ECOWAS Commission deemed it necessary to carry out a study on its organization, structure, procedures, policies and practices in order to detect the needs from which an institutional reform plan could be drafted. The study should have been finished by the start of the year 2014, but there is no available information about it yet.

- **These weaknesses were clearly evidenced on the occasion of the duplication of the aid funds aimed at regional integration between the 9th and 10th EDF.** Given the existing management irregularities (with only 3% of the funds used by the ECOWAS in 2011-2012), the EU commissioned an audit in order to evaluate the ECOWAS in terms of transparency, management and accountability. Due to its negative outcome, the ECOWAS stopped being a direct recipient of EDF funding. Even if it still appears to be a signatory to many agreements, the implementation will be done through international agencies and entities or through the ECOWAS member States⁴⁸.
- For the time being, **the only institutional reform carried out has been the increase in the number of members of the Commission, going from 8 to 15⁴⁹.** This new structure has required the reorganization of tasks and of the different Departments. The objective is to facilitate the representation of all MS in the Commission in order to make it more participatory and inclusive. Another hindrance of the regional integration process is the **existence of several regional organizations with the same mandate and competencies.** The case of the WAEMU/UEMOA (with a historical and cultural French influence) and the ECOWAS (led by Nigeria, an English-speaking country) is a paradigmatic one. **The tensions, overlaps and cases of lack of convergence between both organizations have been numerous and they persist to this day, despite significant progress.** This is the case of the recent WAEMU's plan to set up its own security and conflict prevention mechanism, even though there was a preliminary agreement between both organizations to address these issues jointly within the existing ECOWAS Mechanism⁵⁰. The geopolitical and economic interests of the two European powers linked to each of the organizations (France and the UK) do not foster univocal processes of regional integration and **nothing indicates that this situation is going to change any time soon.**
- **As regards the objective of the future Common Market, with a final goal of reaching an Economic and Monetary Union, the process has become very complex, even though there are some advancements.** The first one was the adoption of the **Protocol on Free Movement of Persons** (1979). The ECOWAS managed to eliminate visa requirements for ECOWAS citizens in all MS and to establish a biometric passport in 13 out of 15 member States (the exceptions were Cabo Verde and The Gambia). As for goods, the progress made over the last few years led to the approval of the structure and regulations of the CET in October 2013, as well as of the planned complementary measures (called Supplementary Protection Tax and Import Adjustment Tax), designed to allow for harmonized CET application. The CET will become operational on 1st January 2015.

⁴⁸ The results of the most recent audit carried out on the ECOWAS have not been communicated to the partners, nor has the information been made public. These information weaknesses are clearly reflected on the ECOWAS website, which does not offer most of the information and documents that have been produced, and many of them are not even distributed to the Abuja-based partners.

⁴⁹ The decision was taken by the Heads of State and Government in July 2013.

⁵⁰ At a recent meeting about financing, the EMUWA has assured TFPs that the document drafted for that purpose was prepared jointly with the ECOWAS. See: <http://www.sidwaya.bf/quotidien/spip.php?article18732>

- **The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS)⁵¹ was a first step towards the free circulation of goods and the creation of the afore-mentioned Common Market⁵².** This liberalisation scheme promoted the creation of national committees, the inclusion of “originating from the ECOWAS” products in order to let them circulate freely among the MS without paying any customs duties and the collaboration between the Commission and the MS in order to solve the conflicts that have arisen, among other issues. However, **the application of the ETLS has been limited. Even though for the most part, the countries have eliminated tariff barriers to raw materials, this has not been the case with manufactured goods.** Once again, in the WAEMU area the degree of application has gone further regarding certificates of origin, statistical nomenclature or customs declarations, among other issues. As for the ECOWAS, there have been some advancements regarding the harmonization of customs codes and duties and the regional customs code is being finalised.
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- In spite of the afore-mentioned advancements, there are certain issues that have kept on hindering the free circulation of people and goods. **Free circulation of people is being hindered by the existence of numerous check-points of different types** (immigration, customs, and security), **the controlling agents’ lack of information, the lack of political will on the part of the MS** and the discriminatory treatment that some countries apply to citizens of other MS, among other issues⁵³. **As regards the goods, the situation is very similar.** Some MS lack directives or refuse to apply the ETLS, and raise **illegal tariff barriers** (illegal duties at the border or along the routes) or non-tariff barriers (refusal to accept valid documents, prohibition to import certain goods, intimidating or cheating behaviour by certain control agents...). All of them are **important challenges in a context characterized by the presence of highly fragmented and little diversified markets; with very different countries economically and in terms of political and institutional stability and with important deficits at the national Governments.** On the other hand, the big informal cross-border trade – which makes the bulk of the intra-region trade – and the interests and social and cultural dynamics around it are a big obstacle for the tax and legal regularization process of this trade⁵⁴. Given that **the correct application of the ETLS is a priority for the advancement of the regional integration process,** at the October 2013 Summit, the Heads of State and Government appointed Burkina’s President Blaise Compaoré as the person in charge of the monitoring and follow-up of these issues and they have come up with some **short and medium term actions** in order to achieve a bigger involvement by the MS.
- As regards the **Community Integration Levy,** even though the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government kept their commitment to reach one common tax for the region, **for the time being they will keep the ones that are in place at the ECOWAS (0,5%) and the WAEMU (1%) for a 5 year transition period.**

⁵¹ See <http://www.etls.ecowas.int>

⁵² Protocole A/PI/1/03 du 31 janvier 2003.

⁵³ To the existing complexity derived from internal ECOWAS’ issues we must add the difficulties originated by the EU’s and some member States’ migration policies

⁵⁴ A pretty significant example (between Nigeria and Benin) of this issue is analysed in the report Political Economy of Regionalisation in West Africa. ODI 2013 (which is addressed to the UK’s Department for International Development, DFID)

- **Another issue of key importance is the dismantling of tariffs**, within the framework of the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) that is being negotiated since the year 2000 and has gone through different stages full of tensions and debate.
- **The Monetary Cooperation Programme, aimed at reaching a single currency by 2020** (which will be preceded by the creation of a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone – WAMZ- which would comprise those countries which are not members of the WAEMU), **the financial integration and free circulation of capital in the region, have not made big advancements either.** Another relevant issue that could become a significant obstacle in the route map to the single currency has to do with **France’s economic and political nexus with the WAEMU zone (FCFA).** The functioning of the FCFA is based on its convertibility which is guaranteed by the French Treasury – and the EU respected this agreement after the Euro came into being – which, as a counterbalance, must keep a percentage of the external reserves of the BCEAO-Central Bank of West African States – it used to be 65% and it is currently 50%-. To this we must add that France still keeps one seat at the BCEAOMonetary Policy Committee⁵⁵.

Besides, the adoption of a single currency and a common monetary zone will require not only the adoption of a common macroeconomic policy, but **the creation of risk-sharing schemes and a very solid institutional support at a regional level, with adequate competencies.** To that end, the current experience at the EU should be taken as a lesson learned.

- The process based in fulfilling the established **criteria of macroeconomic convergence**⁵⁶ sets up goals for budget equilibrium, price stability, monetary financing and Government debt’s sustainability. However, the lack of a regional harmonized common legal, accounting and statistical framework makes the task significantly more difficult. At an internal level, both the WAEMU and the WAMZ have made efforts, but they have not yet reached harmonization for all the ECOWAS. Besides, the member States present a **high degree of economic heterogeneity, with a very high degree of shock asymmetry.**
- **As for the inclusion of the regional initiatives in the national agendas, its achievement relies to a great extent on an adequate functioning of the National Cells** ⁵⁷. Their mandate is to facilitate the participation of the MS in the process of regional integration, promoting the ECOWAS’ activities at the national level, ensuring the coordination with the National Government and facilitating the participation of different actors. **In August 2013 the final version of an Operational Manual was validated** (it was being developed since 2011). It offers different guidelines to harmonize and coordinate

⁵⁵ According to Daniel Bach –Research Director at the CNRS-National Centre for Scientific Research and a professor at Sciences Po Bordeaux-, we must remember that the CFA zone was born as a result of **a decision made by the Member States which decided not to have currency sovereignty after gaining independence**, so this integration “*does not originate in a transfer of sovereignty, but from the transition from an imperial logic to that other of hegemonic dominance*”. See Bach, D. (2009), *Régionalismes, régionalisation et globalisation* ; Mamoudou Gazibo et Céline Thiriot, dirs., *L’Afrique en Science Politique*, Paris, Karthala, p.353 ; http://www.durkheim.sciencespobordeaux.fr/pdf/la_politique_en_afrique_bach.pdf

⁵⁶ It is a triple convergence process. See: UNECA (2013) Socio-economic situation in West Africa. p. 29: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploads/socio-economic_situation_in_west_africa.pdf

⁵⁷ The list of National Cells and their contact details is in the ECOWAS website, even though the document has not been updated since 2006: http://www.comm.ecowas.int/ecowas1/ecowas_unit/ECowas-National-Unit-Directory.pdf

their actions⁵⁸.

- **In relation to the donors and the TFPs, there is also plenty of room for improvement of their actions in this field.** Different issues – such as a poor coordination of the actors involved, complex procedures, economic and geopolitical interests incompatible with development cooperation policy coherence – have a negative impact on different aspects of regional integration. The donors use their own **procedures which, on the other hand, require** an important additional effort on the part of the ECOWAS. Along this line, it is worth mentioning the experience of the **Pool Fund**, which was created in 2006 by Canada, DFID and the AFD (and endowed with 4 mio. USD) to support the **ECOWAS Capacity Building Plan (CBP)**, creating one single Fund which would capture all donors' contributions, managed by the ECOWAS according to its own procedures. Spain joined in 2010, with a contribution of 1 mio. Euros. The Fund was finally suspended in 2011 due to accountability weaknesses on the part of the ECOWAS.
- Finally, in relation to the new geopolitical scenario we have already mentioned, **there is no coordination whatsoever among the big external actors present in the region** (the obvious case is that of China and the EU) so that what, in principle, could be a big opportunity to foster sustainable development and regional integration, becomes in many instances a case of **negative impact risk, induced by the rivalry between those powers and their lack of coordination.** With regards to the ECOWAS and China, bilateral efforts are concentrated on gaining ample access for the former to the 20 bn. USD credit facility opened by the latter for the benefit of African countries.

4.1.-MOST RELEVANT ISSUES RELATED TO SECTORS PRIORITIZED BY SPAIN'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY

4.1.1 AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

As stated, the ECOWAS has been the first African regional community to implement the CAADP through the ECOWAP. Thus a regional policy with a strong food security bias has been designed, to be implemented through a regional investment plan and national investment plans; many programmes and initiatives within this framework, with different actors and donors have been put into place; the necessary institutional mechanisms have been established and the specific regulations adopted.

- **The launch of the Agriculture Working Group led by Spain can be considered as an example of good practice in terms of providing a space for mutual exchange, knowledge and coordination,** which has also created some synergies and avoided duplicities. The excellent work of the Spanish Agency for International Development has been recognized by the ECOWAS Commission's Department of Agriculture⁵⁹. The

⁵⁸ The Cells' work has not been easy in some cases due to lack of State financial support or lack of political commitment (Interview with Jonas Hemou, ECOWAS External Relations Department).

⁵⁹ Interview with Alain Sy Traore, Director of the Agriculture and Rural Department at the ECOWAS Commission.

Working Group – in which the Department of Agriculture also takes part – was created in April 2010, at Spain’s suggestion, in order to comply with the commitments contained in the Declaration of Abuja and it focuses on supporting the ECOWAS’ agricultural policy through the coordination, harmonization and alignment of all aid contributed to this sector. Its main members are the EU, the FAO, the AFD, USAID, Rural Hub and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation. The German International Cooperation agency (GIZ) has shown some interest in joining the Working Group and other donors such as Canada, South Korea and Japan could support the regional agricultural policy.

- However, the process of development of the regional agricultural policy has not been exempt from difficulties. **The elaboration of the NAIP has demanded considerable time and resources** and the regional approach has not yet been rightly included. Besides, at times the NAIP **lack a consistent base line** (that adequately reflects the situation of agriculture on all its sides) and solid indicators to measure the achievement of the planned results⁶⁰. **Nor do they include the emerging issues** (resilience, nutrition, climate change) **adequately and at a national and regional level, other sectors such as fisheries and livestock farming have a minimal presence**⁶¹. The scope of the process has favoured the **dialogue among different stakeholders** – MS, the ECOWAS Commission, inter-governmental organizations, producers’ organizations and civil society – and has **pushed the integration process forward**. At State level the process has varied according to the different MS; in some cases they have conducted inclusive processes that have encouraged participation; in others they have created tensions between national institutions and donors – such is the case of Burkina⁶²-, and in some others they still need to facilitate the inclusion of the producers’ organizations and civil society – such as in the case of Senegal. However, the process has not fostered the creation of some space for exchanging information where the actors involved at a national level could participate in the joint effort of identifying the **key issues at regional level** – a task that, as we have pointed out, was carried out by regional specialist organizations. The result has been a series of NAIP **too focused on internal national issues**, without the benefit of the regional approach.
- To that end, some critics have raised their voices against the way in which the principle of **subsidiarity** has been considered in some of the actions planned in the RAIP, which should be addressed at national and local level, such as social safety nets; or some others that could generate bigger tensions, such as the issue of **land tenure**. Within the ECOWAP framework, **it is foreseen to come up with a Land Tenure Directive Draft based on the AU’s ruling principles to ensure responsible governance** and the creation of a Regional Observatory for this matter. The ECOWAS Working Group in charge of these

⁶⁰ Subsol, S. *Les filières vivrières dans les PNIA*s ; www.cilss.bf

⁶¹ However, an important effort to include these issues in the NAIP and RAIP is being made, as the Forum taking place in Mali in May 2014 (*Forum of National and Regional Stakeholders on Climate-Smart Agriculture in West Africa*) shows. To analyze how to insert instruments that will allow the region to adapt to climate change, visit: http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/ecowas7-30_2014_eng_v5.pdf

⁶² For more information see: Crola, J.D and Sauliere, S. (2011), *Coordinación y alineación de la ayuda: ¿mito o realidad? El ejemplo de la puesta en práctica de la política agrícola regional de la CEDEAO. Informe de Investigación. OXFAM Internacional*, p. 16: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-aid-coordination-alignment-ecowas-141111-es.pdf>

issues met for the first time in 2010⁶³, but for the time being the Directive has not been drafted. The stance it takes on **land grabbing** will be a key one, given it is an issue that affects the whole region negatively – especially Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone – and **how closely related it is to food security, the survival of family farming and local and rural development**. To this end, it is key that the future Directive includes a gender equality approach, taking into account that women's income and productivity are affected by their insecurity in terms of access to land tenure – fuelled by the local uses and traditions that limit women's property rights.

- As for funding, in the NAIP each State made a forecast for resource allocation to each of the six regional priorities in which the national development programmes are inserted. **The priorities with the biggest resource allocation were the ones related to crisis prevention – production increase – and water management. Those related to market promotion and value chains were underfunded in nearly all cases.** Other criticisms to the NAIP have to do with the opacity of their budgets, the **quality of their investments** (which part of the investment in agriculture goes to pay government officers or to administration costs), the still **weak investment flows to support family farming or the scarce presence of a gender approach**.
- **From the Maputo Declaration in 2003 to 2010, the highest growth rate in agriculture was reached in West Africa (4.4%) even though the only countries which achieved the 6% target were Burkina, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Senegal.** Besides, it must be noticed that the percentage of Government resources destined to agriculture has decreased significantly since the eighties. **Between 2003 and 2010 only 4 ECOWAS countries (Burkina, Niger, Mali and Senegal) invested at least 10% of their Government budgets in agriculture.** The bulk of the funding for agriculture came from external sources (in Burkina Faso's case, for instance, it's 70%)⁶⁴. To this situation we must add the difficulties arising from the **funding gaps** present in almost all the NAIP (with the exception of Liberia) which in some cases (such as Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Senegal or Togo) reach up to 50% of the planned investment⁶⁵.
- **Also, food insecurity still affects this region dramatically.** According to the FAO, 13 million people live chronically food-insecure in West Africa. And as per the Global Hunger Index (GHI) data, some countries still present high rates of undernourished population, such as Liberia (31.4%), Sierra Leone (28.8%), Burkina (25.9%), Ivory Coast (21.4%), Senegal (20.5%) or Niger (12.6%). In some other countries (such as Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Nigeria) 8% of the population is undernourished. And 3.4% in Ghana, which offers the best figures in the region.

⁶³ ECOWAS (2010) Meeting of the Task Force on rural land issues in the ECOWAS region 4-6 October 2010, Dakar. Report : http://www.hubrural.org/IMG/pdf/CR_task_force_ECOWAS_foncier_3_ANGLAIS_FINAL.pdf

⁶⁴ According to a study by ROPPA presented at the Agriculture Ministers' Meeting held in September 2013 in Lome. This study also points at the difficulties to have updated, reliable information with disaggregated data, so that it becomes necessary to have an adequate system for data collection, analysis and follow-up.

⁶⁵ Benin, S. and Yu, B (2013) Trends in Public Agricultural Expenditures in Africa. Issue Note No. 22. November 2013. Resakss: <http://www.resakss.org/node/2053>

- Different initiatives are being designed and developed in order to fight this situation and guarantee access to food to the most vulnerable segments of society and to build up resilience: **early alert response** mechanisms, systems to follow up **food prices and availability**, coordination of local and national food reserves with the future regional reserve – organizing the **different defence lines** – social safety nets, etc... Besides, some of the most recent initiatives, such as the **AGIR or Zero Hunger** have been launched in order to insert emerging issues (nutrition, resilience, climate change...) in the national and regional policies, starting with the existing frameworks and intending to improve them and willing to strengthen the regional organizations. AGIR is seen as an exogenous initiative – led by the EU – whilst **Zero Hunger** has raised enormous expectation and could well serve to accelerate the process of coordination and **quality improvement** of the national and regional policies.

- On the other hand, **there are still significant deficits at the institutional level. The Inter-departmental Committee for Food and Agriculture**, which should facilitate coordination between the departments, **has not been created yet**, so that the meetings take place ad hoc according to the existing needs. Besides, **the ECOWADF has been suspended for the time being**, which prevents the implementation of all the actions that depend on those funds. **The reason is the placement of the ECOWADF within the EBID, a financial entity which at present lacks the necessary capacity to manage a fund like this.** The ECOWAS Agriculture Department has applied to open an account at a commercial bank in order to unblock the situation and activate the Fund management⁶⁶. The decision to place the Fund within the EBID was essentially a political one, given that in technical terms the ECOWAS had already been informed about the lack of capacity of that entity, thanks to a report issued by the US Agency for International Development (USAID)⁶⁷.

- **There is also an obvious need to increase the staff allocated to the implementation of the Regional Agricultural Policy.** The Department of Agriculture is understaffed, since it has only 3 officers and must bring in external consultants to get the rest of the work done. Out of 52 new positions offered by the ECOWAS to strengthen the Commission, only one will be dedicated to agriculture. According to the people interviewed for this paper, there are no internal career advancement mechanisms in place and no investment in staff competencies is made, which prevents the organization from benefitting from the professional experience and expertise of its staff, and this situation obviously affects the quality of the design and implementation of regional policy.

- On the other hand, despite the harmonization and alignment efforts fostered by Spain in the Agriculture Working Group and after the botched experience of the Pool Fund, **donors still stick to their own monitoring and reporting procedures**, due to a big extent to the deficits present at the ECOWAS, which has not fulfilled its commitments regarding the technical and financial reporting of projects.

- Regarding the Regional Agricultural Policy, most efforts up to now have been concentrated on increasing production (RAIP's Objective 1) and on the **development of food security**

⁶⁶ At the time of conducting the fieldwork for this report in Abuja (March 2014), the reply to this application was still pending from the Department of Finance.

⁶⁷ USAID (2011) West Africa institutional assessment. Ecowas and related institutions: <http://www.donorplatform.org/component/downloads/finish/15-ecowas/113-ecowas-assessment-final-report-6-27-11.html>

actions targeting the most vulnerable segments of society (RAIP's Objective 3)⁶⁸. The part having to do with market access (RAIP's Objective 2) has not been fully developed yet, though some actions have already been implemented⁶⁹. To that end, **it is key to consider the links between the agricultural policy and other regional integration policies, such as that of natural resources management, the ETLS, trade or infrastructure**, given that the synergies obtained can enhance the impact of the agricultural policy on the region's development and food security.

- **Another example of the advancements achieved on this line has been the participation of the Department of Agriculture in the elaboration of the CET, having succeeded in protecting the sector adequately**, since 50% of the products have been placed within the 20% or 35% bands and none have been included in the 0% band. Besides, 90% of the products within the fifth band are agricultural products⁷⁰. However, the industrialization process in the region will probably lead to changes in the current structure of the CET.
- The freedom of movement for people and goods inside the regional area is a guarantee for food security⁷¹. For that reason, **it will be necessary that the MS apply the ETLS and comply with the existing regulations** (rules of origin, free circulation protocols, etc...). **Protectionist national measures can cause imbalances that have a negative impact on food security**. For that reason, it is important to consider the role that Nigeria can play for food security in the region. In a context of food crisis, **any action by those countries with stronger economies can affect other more vulnerable countries very negatively**⁷².
- Finally, a key element is the advancement of the agricultural policy –at a regional and national level – in terms of **food governance**. The effective **participation** of all the stakeholders at different levels is an **essential element for the appropriation and the advancement of the integration process**, as well as to guarantee true governance. Besides, going beyond placing the population in different categories (classifying them as vulnerable), involves trying to **advance towards fighting the causes that prevent people from making an effective use of any of their rights**, the right to food in this case, which means intensifying the use of all the political tools related to good governance

⁶⁸ According to the conclusions drawn at the NAIP Review Workshop conducted in June 2013 (Ouagadougou), the amount of budgetary resources for agriculture and food security would have been increased and, as a result, agricultural productivity would have also increased.

⁶⁹ For instance, besides the different regulations (on seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, vet services,...) we should mention some programmes such as the *Regional Program to Support Ecowas Markets Regulation; Ecoagris Support Project; Support Project to regional action plan to combat fruit flies; Regional Input Market Project y West Africa Agribusiness and Trade promotion Program*.

⁷⁰ Roquefeuil, Q. et Plunkett, D. (2014) *The impact of closer regional economic integration on food security in West Africa. Discussion Paper.n° 154*, ECDPM; <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/DP-154-Impact-Regional-Economic-Integration-Food-Security-West-Africa-2014.pdf>

⁷¹ See: USAID (2013) *Agribusiness and Trade Promotion Project. "Conference Proceedings: Food Across Borders."* Prepared for the ATP Project by Abt Associates Inc., Bethesda, MD, February 2013; <http://www.agribizafrika.org/sites/default/files/resourcefiles/Jan13/Food%20Across%20Borders%20-%20Conference%20Proceedings.pdf>

⁷² Which was the case of the exchanges between Niger and Nigeria during the 2005 crisis. See: Ba Diao, M., *Le rôle du Nigeria dans la sécurité alimentaire au Niger, Grain de sel n° 51 — juillet – septembre 2010* : http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf_p25-26_Niger.pdf

- making the States accountable, resource management, transparency, effective measures to fight corruption, etc. ...

4.1.2 RENEWABLE ENERGY AND POWER CONNECTIVITY

All the ECOWAS countries are highly dependent on gas and oil imports. Besides, the energy demand is characterized by a high dependence on traditional biomass, which in most countries accounts for 78% of the total energy demand. Around 90% of the population uses firewood and coal as domestic fuel for cooking, with an obvious impact on the environment (deforestation) and health (smoke inhalation).

The **main issues** that best reflect the degree of progress achieved and the potential obstacles in this sector are the following:

- **One key issue, determinant for all others, is the rule of law and political risk**, in which many of the ECOWAS countries present important deficits.
- **The ECREEE's work is fostering multiple synergies and a change of mind with regards to the RE as well as different advancements at the country level.** This is especially important for a sector which still looks pretty new and demands a change of attitude and which faces the strong opposition of some political and business elites with conservative views sustained on vested interests in the current energy system and its dynamics of fossil fuel imports.
- At the regional level, as well as in some countries, **the advancements made so far are actually promoting a certain model which can be replicated in other regions and is producing different synergies.** In 2012, the energy ministers of the southern regional organization (Southern African Development Community) and from East Africa (East African Community) agreed to follow the ECOWAS model for the regional promotion of RE and energy efficiency (taking the EREP and the EEEP as references). The WAPP is considered in many aspects the best regional continental entity in its field and the ECREEE is a model centre in the African continent.
- **Cabo Verde has become an international role model due to its commitment and development of RE. Ghana's regulatory framework (its approaches, mechanisms and incentives) is considered a model in Sub-Saharan Africa.** According to the ECREEE these two countries are playing a leading role in the ECOWAS area, where role models are essential in order to encourage other countries to apply policies that extend the use of RE. Some countries such as Ivory Coast, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal have developed **regulatory frameworks and support mechanisms to reach their national RE targets.** On the other hand, there is a series of countries that stand out because of their energy access ratios, Cabo Verde being the first one of them (it has nearly 100% cover ratio), followed by Ghana (66.7%), Ivory Coast (47.3%), Senegal (42%) and Mali (27%).
- **The RE sector is going through a process of constant evolution in regions such as West Africa** and is becoming more and more attractive, due to the progressive

reduction in RE production costs (thanks to the lower costs of some technologies, such as photovoltaic devices). Besides, there are numerous business models that have demonstrated the viability of different technologies in developing countries (even though the negative perceptions about their potential profitability still persist). These factors are fostering a growing interest from the private sector, as it is clearly shown by the numbers of projects and tenders that are being carried out in the region. This, in many cases, is not in accordance with the quality of the projects presented or the available technical capacities and human resources to implement them. As for the regulatory framework, some of the current challenges require the elaboration and implementation of **regulatory frameworks that foster the existence of Independent Power Producers.**

- The creation of **Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)** offers as well some potentially interesting opportunities and will be a model of collaboration that will grow in the next few years, provided the region and each individual country create adequate conditions. Cabo Verde is the only country that has developed a renewable energy project under the PPP format (Caboéclica) and Ghana is the only ECOWAS member with a specific regulation on PPP, which does not exist at the regional level. The experience in other parts of the world indicates that it **is of the utmost importance to have an independent third-party supervise the whole PPP contract negotiation process in order to guarantee transparency** (which is usually non-existent) and to look after public and social interests. The technical complexities of these projects and the pressing financial needs of Governments tend to tilt the scales in favour of the corporate sector, which gets long-term contracts that are too burdensome for the public coffers. The WAPP currently has a project which is sustained on a PPP⁷³.
- Another favourable factor for the growth of RE and the achievement of the regional targets is **the role being played by some financial institutions and donors.** Within the framework of institutional support structures and international initiatives to promote RE in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is worth mentioning the SE4All initiative, which is managed by the ECREEE in the ECOWAS area. The AfDB – which sponsors the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa – has increased exponentially its **funding for RE projects** since 2005. **Risk insurance** is equally determinant for RE investments of a certain size. The AfDB offers a partial risk guarantee and according to its estimates 80% of the total 2012-2017 allocation will go to RE projects⁷⁴.
- Despite the enormous deficits in the rural areas, in the last few years very few countries have **established that the energy supply to the rural areas should be a national priority.** The main challenge in this sector is that all regional projects bring an **affordable, safe and high-quality power supply for the local population.**

⁷³ At one of the interviews conducted in Brussels on the energy sector and the WAPP projects, it was pointed out that one of the major challenges (and concerns) for this entity is to do the job with transparency.

⁷⁴ To hedge political or commercial risk (serious and unforeseen incidents) one of the reference institutions is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (WB Group) as well as the African Trade Insurance Agency, in case of *force majeure*.

4.1.3 INFRASTRUCTURE

The development of the infrastructure sector is one of the major regional challenges. An important part of the ECOWAS population has no access to basic infrastructure, with logical consequences on their living conditions. Intra-regional commerce is severely restricted for this reason. The most relevant issues are the following:

- The main factors that hinder the development of infrastructure are the **deficits in Government funding, the lack of regulatory and legal frameworks both at national and regional levels, the scarce professional resources of the ECOWAS countries and the abundance of all kinds of red tape and bureaucratic requirements, apart from important problems in terms of institutional coordination.** On the other hand, there is **no regional view on this matter, at the MS level** (except for a few countries, mainly the most isolated) nor is it translated to the national policies. The involvement of the private sector in infrastructure development is also very weak.
- On the other hand, **the inexistence or dilapidated state of the region's infrastructure is a hindrance to rural development and food security.** One of the ways for improvement would be the **construction of secondary corridors that would link the rural areas that produce food to the markets and which would then be inter-connected to the national and regional corridors.** The Development Corridors, on which the NEPAD and the AU have been working for a long time, are the great commitment in this field at a continental level⁷⁵.
- It is also essential to have an **integrated approach** that addresses the deficits in terms of water systems, multipurpose post-harvesting infrastructure (warehouses, commodity processing centres, cold stores,...) and the necessary energy systems (preferably, renewable ones) that allow sustainable growth. **Water management is a key issue in a context marked by severe droughts and climate change, mostly when this kind of infrastructure is almost non-existent in the region**⁷⁶. Through its result 2.2, the RAIP covers adaptation to climate change specifically and the integrated management of shared resources – river basins, cross-border ecosystems, etc. – which makes it essential to improve the coherence and national-regional coordination.
- **Some of the advancements achieved over the last few years have been related to the road network,** up to the point that the EU considers it to be one of the major achievements in the project of regional integration. Other advancements worth mentioning have to do with the elimination of customs offices (mostly in Ghana-Burkina Faso) and other related initiatives. **Other infrastructure vital for regional development, such as railroads and the so-called “dry ports”** (which are intermodal terminals at some location of the interior of a country that are connected by road or railroad to one or several harbours) **are experiencing significant delays to start their operations**

75 See Kuhlmann, K., Sechler, S., and Guinan, J., *Africa's Development Corridors as Pathways to Agricultural Development, Regional Economic Integration and Food Security in Africa A Draft Working Paper*. 2011.

76 Roquefeuil, Q. and Plunkett, D. (2014).

and/or have advanced at a very slow pace. This is the case of the railway connection between Cotonou (Benin) and Parakou (Niger) which has started operating in 2014 and of the construction of “dry ports” in both countries, which has been marked by tensions and the interests of different groups on each side.

- It also necessary to develop solid legal frameworks that impose on the corporate sector the obligation to comply with **international standards on labour, human rights and the environment.** This is equally applicable to all economic sectors.

5.- EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES

The Cotonou Agreements, signed in 2000 and preceded since 1975 by the Lome Agreements (through 4 different Conventions)⁷⁷ make the backbone of the strategic framework between the EU and the ACP countries for the regional integration of these countries. The experience of the EU has influenced and modelled the ECOWAS, which explains the strong institutional and economic biases⁷⁸.

In the ECOWAS region the EU has tried to foster the regional integration processes especially from the 8th and 9th EDF. From the 10th EDF the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) had a new focus due to the negotiation of the EPA and the stronger political mandates of the African regional organizations. In budgetary terms this watershed moment meant doubling the EU's aid at regional level. This EDF committed 587 mio. Euros for West Africa out of which 411 mio. Euros were earmarked for the regional integration process, including capacity building, market integration and supporting measures to facilitate the EPA implementation. Political Cooperation has been the other priority sector.

Some of the **main issues** related to the EU policy and the ECOWAS regional integration process are the following:

- The EU gave a **decisive support for the consolidation of the WAEMU's Customs Union, which is a reference for the ECOWAS.** In general terms, it can be said that the EU's technical support helped to develop a regulatory framework for the integration of the different economies at the regional level. However, **this support has not meant any significant increase on investment and intra-regional trade** (estimated at around 10-15%) **so far.**
- As for the infrastructure sector, the Regional Strategy Document of the 2008-2013 RIP highlights the **EU's contribution to the construction and rehabilitation of the regional road network and to the legal and regulatory harmonization.** Given the presence of other external actors and the existence of other priorities, the EU's support to the development of the regional road system will be reduced in net terms from the 11th EDF, which only foresees the rehabilitation and construction of short road sections.

⁷⁷ In 2008 the European Commission issued its Communication “*Integración Regional para el Desarrollo en los países ACP*”.

⁷⁸ See Sanoussi Bilal, *External Influence on Regional Integration in West Africa, the role of third parties.* West Africa Institute-ZEI, P.33 y ss. On page 40 of this document there is a chart showing the specific objectives, previous results and areas of intervention for the West Africa RIP 2008-2013.

- The EU is currently implementing a project with a total cost of 9.8 mio. Euros (where the EU contributes 8.9 mio. Euros from the 10th EDF)⁷⁹ aimed at **supporting the ECOWAS Commission for the right implementation of its regional strategy** so that it can carry out its mandate adequately, through an efficient management of resources.
- **With regard to the regional EPA, the European Commission (EC) considers that these agreements offer new opportunities to consolidate the economic structure of the countries in the region and to lay the foundations for sustainable growth.** On the other hand, the EU regards the EPA as an instrument to boost the joint commitment of the EU and the ECOWAS to speed up the reduction or elimination of hindrances to trade among the EU's MS and those of the ECOWAS as well as (according to the EU) within the ECOWAS space itself; and to consolidate the economic integration of the ECOWAS member States, those of the WAEMU and between both regional organizations.
- Since the EU made its proposal, the EPA has caused a great debate. **The ECOWAS countries decided in 2003 to negotiate an EPA jointly, except for two of them – Ghana and Ivory Coast – which decided to negotiate separately interim agreements** in order to preserve their economic interests before the expiry date (initially set by the EC for December 2007) of the Cotonou Agreement transitional period. With the exception of these two countries, **the rest of the ECOWAS MS have maintained, to a greater or lesser extent, a position of reluctance and/or outright opposition**⁸⁰. The clashes between Ghana and Ivory Coast, on one side, and the rest of the ECOWAS countries on the other side; affected the regional integration process negatively. The EU's initial position, proposing an informal unilateral negotiation with the WAEMU (which communicated its readiness to sign an EPA with the EU) also harmed that process. There are numerous reports that show the drawbacks that a progressive tariff dismantling would bring to African countries. 13 of the 15 ECOWAS countries are ruled by, given they are Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Everything but Arms (EBA) Treaty, which allows them to export their produce to the EU exempt from tariffs and duties⁸¹. **All the different analyses agree that the EPA, under their current format, are not the adequate framework to link commerce with the sustainable development of African countries.**
- Some of the issues exposed on those reports refer to the obvious **economic differences between both parties** (EU-African countries) and warn that **the benefit that trade liberalisation brings is directly related to the degree of economic and institutional development of each country and region.** Other problematic issues have been the challenges that the non-tariff barriers to trade bring (for instance, sanitary and phytosanitary standards) and the so-called “rules of origin”. **Other negative aspects of the EPA are their potential to deteriorate the food sovereignty principle on**

⁷⁹ *Support ECOWAS Public Finance Management Reforms CRIS number: ROC/FED/021-523.*

⁸⁰ The case of Nigeria is a remarkable one. In 2008 it rejected the EPA categorically, to the point of blocking the negotiations with the EU.

⁸¹ Even though this option is restricted by the capacity of many MS of actually making use of it, given the obstacles that represent the different European standards, which require a high level of training and specialization from the part of the region's exporters and limit their possibilities to enter the European market.

which the ECOWAP is based, the damages in terms of intellectual property rights and the reduction of tax revenue and the fact that they will not foster intra-regional trade and its added value. The alleged positive impact of the EPA on trade diversification is also questioned and they also point at the negative impacts on the local corporate and trade sector caused by a massive import of European products⁸².

- **As for the hypothetical benefits of the EPA**, beyond the general advantages exposed by the EU – and the direct benefits for the European corporates (many of which are already operating and exporting from Africa) – **there is no available report which offers a detailed analysis of the potential impacts** which, in any case, is a very complex task given that the planned liberalisation operates on different tariff lines, in a staggered manner and in the medium and long term, so that there are innumerable variables to be taken into account⁸³.
- There is currently an **agreement signed by the EU's and the ECOWAS' representatives to negotiate the EPA**, whereby the EU-ECOWAS EPA would allow for a **75% tariff dismantling in 20 years**. This agreement, as well as the **PEPAD** protocol (the programme intended to offset the impacts of the EPA on the ECOWAS via "Aid for Trade") remains confidential. **With regards to the latter, in March 2014 the EC announced a contribution of 6.5 bn. Euros for the period 2014-2019: 3 bn. Euros** coming from the 11th EDF (linked to the RIP and NIP and the relevant instruments from the EU's general budget); 1.2 bn. Euros from the EIB and the rest from the MS. The potential validation of the EU-ECOWAS EPA was on the agenda at the Heads of State and Government Summit that took place at the end of March 2014 in Yamoussoukro (a few days prior to the EU-Africa Summit), but it finally did not take place. Nigeria, which is a highly protectionist country, was the main opponent to that validation.
- **The 3 issues that to this day still block the regional EPA's validation refer to: 1) the offer for access to the ECOWAS market by the EU's MS** (regarding products and percentages along the agreed period), given that there are some products that would be immediately liberalised whilst others, such as the agricultural products, would be postponed till 2034; 2) **the amount of aid related to the PEPAD** (which is considered a key issue by the ECOWAS countries) and 3) **the non-execution clause for the EPA in case of serious human rights violations**. If the validation and ratification of the regional EU-ECOWAS EPA would not take place (the deadline is October 2014) and Ghana and Ivory Coast would go ahead and ratify their respective agreements, **the process of regional integration would be clearly distorted**. The EU goods destined for West Africa would presumably be imported through Ghana and Ivory Coast, which would alter the project of a Common Market that these two countries make up with the rest of ECOWAS member States.

⁸² The massive import of Chinese products aimed for the African markets has already caused many tensions in different African countries. A textbook case has been that of the textile industry in South Africa, with thousands of job losses caused by the competition of Chinese imports.

⁸³ In one of the interviews conducted at the EC, it was pointed out that for the period 2009-2011 a study was made by the EU and the ECOWAS in order to analyse the issues related to the impact of the EPA in West Africa even though, according to the same source, it was never published at the request of the ECOWAS.

- Another EU's initiative not free from controversy is the **Raw Materials Initiative**⁸⁴ (2008), driven by the EU's great dependency on the imports of commodities (the EU only produces 3% of the metal minerals it consumes) and their economic importance. The 3 pillars of this initiative consist of securing access to raw materials in the international markets, promoting commodity extraction from European sources and reducing consumption. The first one of these objectives and its implementation - aimed at getting the maximum advantage for the supply of unprocessed commodities free from export duties and tariffs⁸⁵ - has been criticized for focusing only on protecting the interests of the European corporates and overlooking the interests of the exporter countries, many of them African. Mostly when we take into account that **one of the great economic and corporate deficits of the African countries is their extremely limited capacity for processing and manufacturing, as it has been pointed out by numerous experts**⁸⁶.
- Within the 11th EDF framework and regarding the ECOWAS, the **Regional Indicative Programme is still being prepared** and the ECOWAS National Indicative Programmes are in an advanced stage of elaboration. **West Africa is the region that attracts the biggest amount of funding from the entire ACP region: 6.4 bn. Euros, of which 1.2 bn. Euros will be destined for the Regional Indicative Programme.** The new EDF will apply the **guidelines of the EU Agenda for Change**, in order to improve aid efficiency and impact, coordination among different stakeholders and policy coherence, among other objectives. **The aid flows will be concentrated on maximum 3 sectors in each country** (even though in the case of some LDCs it might be 4 or 5, according to an EU source).
- **The issue of development policy coherence related to different fields such as trade, energy security, migration and conflict prevention is one of the pending issues for the EU and its MS**, so that its definition within the 11th EDF framework will be determinant to improve aid efficiency and impact.
- Regarding the 11th EDF, **it is foreseen that a bigger share of the resources is channelled through different financial instruments, either existing or new ones, such as the so-called blending** (which consists of combining donations and loans) and other risk-sharing schemes that will attract more resources and thus increase impact. Blending will therefore have a **lead role as a funding mechanism**. The efficacy of this mechanism in terms of contributing to innovation and increasing development impact is not automatically guaranteed, **it requires taking in lessons learned and a solid coordination, monitoring and evaluation exercise**⁸⁷.

Regarding the **sectors that have been analysed in this report**, it is worth mentioning the following actions and initiatives:

⁸⁴ See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/index_en.htm

⁸⁵ On the other hand and in order to offset the excessive benefits for the foreign investors, over the last few years numerous mineral-rich African States have modified their investment codes, rising different taxes.

⁸⁶ This is one of the critical issues for the *Africa Mining Vision* (adopted by the AU in 2008), given its wide-ranging social and economic repercussions.

⁸⁷ Bilal S. & F. Krätke, *Blending loans and grants for development: an effective mix for the EU?* ECDPM, 2013.

- As a response to the 2008 food crisis, the UE created a **Food Facility** which was endowed with 1 bn. Euros for developing countries – amongst them West Africa States – and which included policy measures targeting food availability and access to it for the most vulnerable. Implemented along the years 2009 to 2011, the evaluation of this instrument - carried out in 2013 – has allowed us to extract recommendations which are being embedded in the EU actions (such as the resilience approach, capacity building, the relationship between governance and food security, etc.)⁸⁸. Within the **Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013 framework, the EU states its support to West Africa – both to the ECOWAS and to the EMUWA**– in order to face the food crisis that at the time affected the region, through the RAIP and other actions involving the transformation and management of natural and agricultural resources, aimed at improving agricultural productivity, facilitating trade and introducing information systems (especially statistics and decision-making support systems). The EU has funded the regional project to fight fruit flies and the ECOAGRIS project, as well as different support programmes for the adoption of sanitary, phytosanitary and veterinary standards.

In the current phase, the EU is going to support the **Regional Food Reserve** contributing 56 mio. Euros through a Delegated Cooperation project – which, as already stated, will be implemented by AECID and the AFD – that revolves around several actions: supporting the reserve's governing system, supporting the national and local storage systems and supporting the farming information system, especially aimed at reducing vulnerability. **The EU is leading the AGIR Initiative to improve resilience in the Sahel and West Africa**, in order to break the vicious circle of drought, famine and poverty. The EU has announced a contribution of 5 bn. Euros for the AGIR (from the 11th EDF funds for the period 2014-2020), which includes a 3.9 bn. Euros bilateral aid contribution for the Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) and a 1.15 bn. Euros contribution to the regional programmes.

As for agricultural products commercial exchanges, the EU imports some products from West Africa, such as cocoa beans, bananas or cotton. The EU and Africa have created an association to develop the cotton sector⁸⁹, which they intend to promote. **The producers' organizations and the civil society representatives question the impact of this type of crops in the communities' sustainable development; especially as far as food security is concerned.**

- **Regarding fisheries, it is worth mentioning the controversies that the agreements have caused** since, according to some activists and NGOs, they benefit the EU but damage the long-term sustainable development of developing countries, increasing malnutrition in the region and the pressure on land resources⁹⁰. The pressure of public opinion and advocacy campaigns from some civil society organizations has made the EU change its fisheries agreements to make them more sustainable, suspending the fishing activities in some coastal areas temporarily, in order to let the stocks recover.

⁸⁸ For further information see: European Commission (2013) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Final Report on the implementation of the EU Food Facility.

⁸⁹ EC Communication to the Council and EP, February 12 2004: «Propuesta de asociación UE-África en apoyo del desarrollo del sector algodonero» [COM (2004) 87 final –not published at EU Official Journal].

⁹⁰ As an example: Greenpeace (2011) Until the very last fish. The absurd model of deep sea fisheries. Ocean Inquirer. Issue n°2

- **In the energy sector, the collaboration between the EU and Africa has been implemented since 2007 through the Africa-EU Energy Partnership. The EU's support to the RE sector has grown steadily over the last few years. In 2010 the EUEI PDF was launched to support the implementation of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme⁹¹. The EU has also opened a 65 mio. Euro credit facility to offer technical assistance to developing countries in relation to the SE4All Initiative, especially to West and Central Africa countries.**
- **In 2013 the EC announced a 95 mio. Euro contribution to 16 projects in 9 African countries (among them Burkina Faso, Senegal, Liberia and Sierra Leone) to supply energy in the rural areas, which will be rounded up (to a total amount of 155 mio. Euros) with contributions from the beneficiary entities. One of the major examples often quoted by the EU among its actions in the RE sector, is the support it has given to the construction of the biggest photovoltaic plant of all West Africa, which is being built in Burkina Faso and will produce 32 GV/hour yearly, equivalent to 6% of the country's current energy supply or to the demand of around 400,000 citizens.**
- **Over the years, the EU policy to support the infrastructure sector has become more regionally focused, in accordance to the guidelines of the EU Agenda for Change. Budget-wise, the amounts destined for the region's infrastructure in the subsequent European Development Funds have been increased.**
- **In the 10th EDF the estimated amount of funds allocated to energy and transport infrastructure in West Africa is around 300 mio. Euros. There are 3 projects still ongoing: the project to support the ECOWAS and EMUWA Commissions to facilitate transport (endowed with 27 mio. Euros); the rehabilitation of a road section with regional scope in Burkina Faso (25.4 mio Euros) and the rehabilitation of the trans-Sahara road section between Zinder (in Niger) and the border with Nigeria (19.5 mio Euros).**
- **In the energy sector and in relation to the 10th EDF, 141.5 mio Euros were allocated to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF), destined for projects under the SE4All blending format. For the 11th EDF, apart from the support given to the WAPP and to the West Africa Programme for the ACP-EU Energy Facility (30 mio. Euros), a series of projects (improved stoves, energy connection, extension of the power grid in Niamey, Niger) were approved, for a total amount of around 200 mio. Euros. The ITF has supported various projects in West Africa (at yearend 2013, 23% of the total Fund had been destined to this region) related to access to energy supply, energy infrastructure, RE funding and support to private companies investing in RE and energy efficiency.**
- **According to EU sources, the amount foreseen by the 11th EDF is equivalent to 400 mio. Euros (which will probably be evenly split between transport and energy). The EDF's support will focus on the three big corridors already mentioned (trans-coastal, trans-Sahelian and the railroad between Abidjan-Ouagadougou and N'djamena). In September 2013 10 regional projects were shortlisted for potential funding, for a total amount equivalent to 740 mio. Euros, among them the rehabilitation of the Bamako-Dakar and Abidjan-Ouagadougou railroads.**

⁹¹ For more information on this initiative see: <http://www.africa-eu-renewables.org/index.php?lang=eng&page=117>

- The joint work experience between the EU and the ECOWAS offers a good number of reflections that it is key to take into account. In general terms and according to the EC's view, **despite the increase of funds allocated to regional programmes under the 10th EDF, the progress in terms of regional integration in Africa over the past four years has been very limited**, as well the degree of implementation of those funds. The EC assumes a shared responsibility and quotes the **RIP mid-term reviews** carried out as a necessary instrument to improve aid programming and its operability and to include the learned lessons in the 11th EDF⁹². To that end, even though each Regional Economic Community in Africa has its own specifications, **the EC points out five key issues** applicable to all of them and which refer to, besides other questions already mentioned, an **inadequate mandate** of the regional organizations; the existence of **overlaps between regional organizations and mandates; a poor implementation of the economic integration agreements; the strong dependency on exports** of a reduced number of products and the **inefficient infrastructure inter-connection**.

⁹² Communication by Andris Piebalgs, EU Commissioner for Development, 2013.

CONCLUSIONS

The **main conclusions** to be drawn are the following:

1. España Spain maintains a Foreign and Cooperation Policy aimed at strengthening the regional integration processes and stability of **West Africa**, considered a **priority region in the fields of security and sustainable human development**. Spain's Development Cooperation Policy has focused so far on **agriculture and food security, renewable energy and power connectivity, infrastructure, and migration and development**. Spain is a leader on agriculture and food security in this region, given the sizable amount of funds contributed and its **commitment and coherent track record –gradually built up –** in a sector which is an absolute priority for the ECOWAS countries.

The support given to different entities to build up their capacity is at different stages. In the case of the ECREEE –with a performance in the field of RE that can be considered ideal – the results are tangible; with regards to the RAAF, a considerable effort has been made to support its recent launch and to make it operational, given that the RAIP implementation will rely on its performance and the PPDU's activation has been delayed for too long, evidencing important institutional weaknesses.

2. **In agriculture, the ECOWAS is at the continent's forefront in the implementation of the CAADP**, through the **ECOWAP**, which has made it possible to support the integration process mobilizing different actors at various levels around a common agenda. A **regional policy** based on a food sovereignty logic has been designed, organised around **a regional investment plan and national investment plans**; numerous programmes and initiatives have been conducted with different actors and donors; the necessary institutional mechanisms have been put in place and specific regulations have been adopted. **Spain's work as leader of the TFP in this sector has been a key one**, creating a space for coordination and harmonization among donors aimed at being aligned with the regional priorities.

The NAIP and RAIP have fostered **spaces for dialogue** and a certain increase of investment in this sector, even though most countries have not yet met the targets set by the Maputo Declaration. **The NAIP should stand up to the challenge of including the emerging issues** (resilience, nutrition climate change), **mainstreaming gender** in all the sector actions and progressing toward a regional approach overcoming an internal-national oriented design. The regional initiatives (AGIR, Zero Hunger, amongst others) will serve to support this task. In any case, it will be a priority to avoid duplicities and manage the available resources efficiently. As per the RAIP, even though for the time being the focus has been on production increase and food security of the most vulnerable segments of the population, **the rate of progress has not been the same with regards to market access. The link among these three elements is key** to increase productivity and gear it towards rural development, to ensure risk prevention and preparedness and resilience; to facilitate the implementation of social safety nets and income diversification

and to support value chains and markets access; to integrate food security and nutrition adequately in the regional and national policies and to improve research as well as analysis and data collection on these issues. For that, it is **also key to review the link between the ECOWAP and other regional policies** (natural resources management, trade, ETLS, infrastructure) and to foster synergies.

3. **In the field of renewable energy, the EREP and EEEP are well established policies;** the focal national institutions are developing their action plans; the updated and full assessment of the resource potential for each country is in place and there is a whole series of programmes promoted by the ECREEE and the ECOWAS (besides the WAEMU and other regional organizations) aimed at achieving the regional targets on RE and energy efficiency. Besides, **the EREP and the WAPP are complementary.** The WAPP is more geared towards to the big-scale hydropower and the EREP tries to add significant volume of new renewable energy to the energy mix.
4. **With regards to infrastructure** – considered by the ECOWAS and the EU, among other donors, as a priority for regional integration – the region has experienced significant improvements in the **road system.** There are also some regional energy projects which are already in place and some plans funded by the WAPP which, if they were implemented, would mean a turning point at the regional level. Many of these projects have suffered **significant delays** due to the different interests of public and private stakeholders. **The rural world has been traditionally excluded,** even though both international and national entities have geared their plans and programmes over the last few years to make up for the enormous weaknesses existing. **The development of infrastructure that will allow for the transportation of farm products and the exchanges between zones** is a priority, as well as all infrastructure (on which the EU as well as other donors have focused) that facilitates the traffic of goods and the movement of people among the different countries (and which connects those countries that are isolated with the sea ports)
5. **The major challenge that the integration process still faces is the transposition of the regional policies to the national context and the design of national policies focused on regional interests.** It is worth mentioning the new Operational Handbook for the **National Integration Cells** that will give some guidelines to harmonize and standardize their operations. If these Cells fulfill their mandate⁹³, the integration process could be boosted.
6. The Revised ECOWAS Treaty created new regional institutions and boosted integration through policy harmonization, infrastructure development and regional liberalisation, which has allowed for some **advancements towards political and economic convergence, regarding the free movement of people and on regional policy design** (for agriculture, the environment, water resources management, renewable energy). **The process of economic and monetary integration is very slow.** Pushing the MS artificially to achieve the macroeconomic convergence targets could have some negative

⁹³ As we have already stated in this report, their mandate is to facilitate the participation of the MS in the regional integration process, promoting the ECOWAS' activities at the national level, ensuring governmental coordination and facilitating the different stakeholders' participation.

impacts on the States and their citizens, to the detriment of inclusive growth, which is essential for the development of the MS and the region.

7. **The free circulation of people and goods**, which is a basic condition for a future common market, **still poses numerous challenges for its effective operability**. The correct implementation of the ETLS is a clear priority for the gradual elimination of the numerous tariff and non-tariff barriers. The approval of the CET structure and its complementary measures will have to come along the effort on the part of the MS to make their tariff bands converge. The CET has made it possible to deepen the dialogue among the MS and, on the other side, to increase the protection on agricultural products.
8. **With regards to politics and security, to a great extent, stability remains to be the big issue on which the advancement of the processes analysed in this report still depend on**. The ECOWAS and its peacekeeping corps (ECOMOG) have contributed to solving some conflicts in the region. However, their logistical and operational capacity is limited when they are facing complex emergencies.
9. The obstacles for the ECOWAS we have analysed in this report come, on one hand, from **the MS' resistance to relinquish their sovereignty in some fields and, on the other hand, from the institutional weaknesses** existing on the part of the ECOWAS. The lack of technical capacity, the insufficient human resources, the slowness and inadequacy of the internal procedures interfere with and slow down the implementation of decisions and therefore hinder the development of different strategies. **The ECOWAS's weaknesses in terms of fund management, transparency and accountability have recently driven the EU to channel its aid through some international agencies and organizations, or directly through the MS**, at the expense of an alignment and appropriation directly focused on the ECOWAS and its institutions.
10. **The existence of two major regional organizations (the ECOWAS and the WAEMU; with overlapping mandates and competencies) has not facilitated the advancement of regional integration either**. The tensions, the overlaps and lack of convergence between both organizations have been numerous and, despite important advancements, they still persist, which has a negative impact on the integration process, aside from preventing the optimization of scarce resources. France's political and economic support to the WAEMU has facilitated its consolidation, being the organization that has achieved a higher level of integration in the African continent – even though its track record does not seem to aim at subsuming the WAEMU into the ECOWAS. Both organizations have coordinated their work in different areas, but maintain outstanding divergences in others.
11. **The existence of different inter-governmental institutions and initiatives at the regional level results in a complex framework of actors, programmes and projects**, which hinders appropriation and alignment. **The multiple strategies, organizations and TFP (whose operational processes are complex and diverging) do not make the task any easier either**. The lack of coordination among the latter has damaged the advancement of different programmes or processes. The same can be said about the pressures caused at times by economic and political interests. **Committing funds that finally were not disbursed** has also weakened at times the

capacity and efficacy of the actions, which in many cases were crucial in order to improve the living conditions of the local population. **The same can be said about the lack of multiannual programming of aid**, at the expense of its predictability and, therefore, its impact.

- I2 Another factor that has helped to distort the integration process has been the EPA negotiation with the EU and the tensions created among the members of this regional area arising from the interim EPA negotiated separately with Ghana and Ivory Coast.** The year 2014 should be decisive to clarify the scenario created by the potential validation of the regional EPA by the ECOWAS. If the validation would not go ahead and Ghana and Ivory Coast would ratify their respective EPA, we can anticipate this will have negative implications for the integration process. Which turns out to be paradoxical, taking into account that the EPA has raised **serious tensions and debates between the EU and the ECOWAS, due to the opposition on the part of some of the ECOWAS member States and numerous producers' organizations and civil society representatives** (both international and local), who perceive these agreements as harmful for West Africa's development.
- I3 Projecting the EU's experience as a model for the ECOWAS has meant supporting the institutional capacity building, the economic development (with the EPA as a key tool) and improving regional governance and stability.** The 9th, 10th and 11th EDF reflect a long record of increasing focus on regional integration and economic development, with some essential sectors- such as energy - growing more important. **The balance sheet shows some achievements in certain areas** (infrastructure, institutional and regulatory development, agricultural policy and that of other sectors, such as renewable energy) **and some failures** (the most important one to date being the negotiation process of the ECOWAS' EPA and its multiple hindrances). The bilateral experience accumulated by both organizations – with a turning point given by the EPA's final result – points at the need **to reflect jointly about the convenience of extrapolating certain regional integration models.**
- I4 The presence of the new emerging powers** in the region, whose agenda is mainly focused on bilateral relations and interests (with no focus on regional development for the time being) demands an additional **effort and political will** to make all the policies and actions of all the external actors present in the region come together for the benefit of the interest and development priorities of all the population of the ECOWAS member States.

GUIDELINES

The following guidelines originate in the analysis developed throughout this report. Some are of a general kind and others are specifically addressed to the TFP and especially to the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development.

I. INTRA-REGIONAL GUIDELINES (ECOWAS) AND GUIDELINES RELATED TO THE EU-ECOWAS RELATIONSHIP:

- I.1. In line with the Paris Declaration, all partner countries must commit to carry out the necessary actions in order **to improve their institutional capacities, increase their transparency and fight corruption**. To that end, Spain (like its European partners) should **intensify its advocacy work in order to make the ECOWAS implement the necessary reforms to carry out its mandate adequately**. Even though a considerable effort has been made to use the ECOWAS procedures and systems, the institution's weaknesses have prevented it from progressing on that front due to its failures in terms of accountability (which effectively prevent it from being able to comply with mutual accountability obligations).
- I.2. In the short term, it is urgent **to modify the ECOWAS mechanisms** and internal procedures that are blocking the start and implementation of the regional programmes and strategies. It is worth mentioning the case of the internal approval procedure, which needs the Commission President's signature and therefore causes significant delays or how slow the process to hire external consultants is. Also, the prohibition issued by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in 2008 prevents it to hire staff out of its own resources and hinders the adequate staff rotation for programme implementation. This prohibition could be lifted given the ECOWAS audit results, but there is no official news to this respect, for the time being. **The donors should come up with viable alternatives, as Spain has done in the RAAF case, in order to temporarily fill up the management job vacancies and to strengthen the institution.**
- I.3. Given the important ECOWAS' **weaknesses in terms of data, statistics and information (documents, reports, research) which are updated, available, rigorously tested and centralized**; any investment in this field would benefit the decision-making process and the follow-up, appraisal and evaluation of projects and programmes.
- I.4. **The need to deepen our knowledge of all the key issues related to development in all its aspects and to regional integration**. To this end, the issue of the **EU-ECOWAS EPA** and its potential adverse effects on the ECOWAS MS is a priority. The year 2014 is a crucial one so that, depending on the final outcome of this issue, the TFP will have to assume the learned lessons and take the necessary decisions

to avoid distorting the regional integration process and, above all, **to foster sustainable human development for all the ECOWAS member States and their population.**

- I.5. The **EU** could play a **federative role as coordinator of the TFP of its member States**. That would lessen the work burden for the recipients, deepen the European integration process itself and allow for a bigger impact of aid. The alternative ways, such as **delegated cooperation**, are good examples of good practices. To that end, the participation of AECID - along with the AFD – in the EU's delegated cooperation project for the food security regional reserve is very pertinent.
- I.6. On the other hand, the ECOWAS and its MS should make the necessary efforts to gradually reduce their external aid dependency. For that, it is key to recover the **public investment** destined for those sectors known to be development sources – such as agriculture – and to improve the endowment and management of public budgets mostly related to basic social services for the poorest. It is worth mentioning that several countries in the region receive significant income driven by the rising price of minerals and oil in the international markets and the growing demand from emerging powers. **Redistribution and inclusive policies** built upon the basis of transparency could bring a radical change to the region's situation in terms of sustainable development.
- I.7. Given the existing management deficiencies and in a context of major development challenges – to which the economic and financial crisis affecting many donors must be added – **the growing trend to establish Public and Private Partnerships must be examined on a case by case basis and with an approach that prioritizes the public interest and the positive impact on the region's sustainable development**. The cases already taking place in Africa in some sectors such as agriculture (in which a widespread phenomenon of land grabbing is taking place) point at the need to verify first which kind of reforms to attract private investment are being pushed, which rights and obligations are attributed to them, **which kind of consultation is made to the population and local actors and which potential impacts they might have and which codes of conduct for corporate social responsibility (voluntary and, mostly, compulsory) are in place**.
- I.8. **Experience indicates that respecting the autonomy of endogenous processes and their own specific cultural characteristics requires avoiding interferences that intend to accelerate or artificially gear the regional integration**. The timing and methods that can be foreign to the momentum and characteristics of the ECOWAS and its member States, risk being ineffective and impacting negatively on the national and regional appropriation processes. Reconciling the necessary caution with the political will to advance is certainly complex, but most relevant. To that end, the EU could be taken as an example to showcase the risks involved in forcing convergence when the specific situations of the MS present such a high degree of heterogeneity.
- I.9. The need to deepen our knowledge of those key issues, to identify adequately the potential supports and to inform the decisions in the best possible way, makes it also advisable **for the EU's member States and their Development Cooperation Agencies to research carefully all those aspects and subjects that require so**.

As an example, one of the issues that can be relevant is that related to the role of civil society and the social movements from the different ECOWAS member States, their position about regional integration and their capacity to influence policies and institutions. The scarce participation so far and the disconnection of the people from these issues were already identified as key issues for the elaboration of the ECOWAS “2020 Vision”. The planned reform of the ECOWAS Parliament should aim at facilitating the civil society’s participation in the regional integration process, thus becoming a truly representative institution.

Another interesting question is that of the role that some countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are playing for the advancement of regional issues within the WAEMU’s framework. The **previous identification of potential issues for research** is a question that has already been addressed by some Development Agencies (such is the case of the study carried out by the IDO for DfID).

- I.10 As background to everything that has been presented, it is necessary to stress the **urgent need to address on the part of the EU and its MS, along with the ECOWAS and its MS, key issues for the region’s peace and stability and for sustainable human development**. These issues – such as the respect and protection of fundamental rights and liberties, the transparent and accountable management of natural resources, the actions against climate change, the policy measures for social cohesion and the basic social services for the most disadvantaged segments of the population – are, in the first place, of a political nature and then they are determined by the economic and corporate interests of European as well as African actors. **The future of the region**– perceived at different fora, along with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, as the new El Dorado given its GDP growth rates – and of its integration processes **depend on those issues being addressed in a coherent and resolute way** so that growth ends up driving development.

Women are key stakeholders for the region’s development – especially in some sectors where they play a key role – such as family and small farming, which contribute to the community food security and development or health – so that **gender⁹⁴ will have to be effectively mainstreamed** in the regional and national policies and programmes, in order to generate inclusive processes that tend to the special situation of women.

II. GUIDELINES RELATED TO THE TFP:

- II.1. **On the part of the group of TFP there is a whole series of actions, related to the already mentioned existing deficits that offer clear scope for improvement**. The spaces for coordination (among the TFP and among these and the ECOWAS) help to improve aid’s efficiency and to push the regional integration processes forward. The donors will have to contribute as much as they can to **generate spaces**

⁹⁴ Given the profile of the new ECOWAS Gender Commissioner, Fatimata Dia Sow, she will be able to tend to these issues if the Department receives adequate support from the ECOWAS, the MS and TFPs. The first challenge would be building up its capacity. A strategy based on mainstreaming gender would allow its integrated and effective implementation.

for dialogue, agreement and coordination, keeping their support in those spaces geared towards **alignment and harmonization** in which the positive results are apparent – such as in the case of the **Agriculture Working Group**, led by Spain – and facilitating its creation in those fields for which they do not exist, provided these are sectors in which the TFP can bring in some added value and sector specialization.

- II.2. It is also important to count with the **ECOWAS National Cells**, engaging them in the processes implemented by the TFP and strengthening their role, which is key for the integration process.
- II.3. In the case of Development Cooperation Agencies such as AECID, the current position and accumulated experience should facilitate the improvement of different aspects such as the **elaboration of base lines and (objective and verifiable) consistent indicators which facilitate the management, monitoring and evaluation of their actions at the regional level** and, therefore, their capacity build-up in order to focus their actions and to learn lessons and good practices.
- II.4. As for the donors, an issue we have already pointed out is the need **to comply with their international commitments** and the relevance of aid's predictability. **Efficient and well-targeted aid in West Africa is an extremely valuable tool in the hands of a country such as Spain**; taking into account all the challenges posed by a region of special strategic interest. Despite the crisis and its impact and according to these interests and the commitments made by Spain, **the aid flows destined for key sectors to fight hunger and poverty in a region which is key for the country should not be facing any budget cuts**.
- II.5. For the different sectors analysed in this report, the **South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation experiences are becoming more and more important**, which is something to take into account when thinking about future support by external actors. As an example, Cabo Verde's experience with wind power can benefit the projects ongoing in Senegal; and the ECOWAS's contacts with Brazil within the Zero Hunger initiative framework are a means of exchange of experiences and good practices in food security.

III. GUIDELINES FOR SPAIN'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICY:

As far as Spain and its track record in the region are concerned, we can point out the following issues:

- III.1. **Sector focus and an action designed with a regional approach have placed Spain in a good regional position, acknowledged by the ECOWAS and other donors** – such as in the case of agriculture and RE – and it deserves a continuous and sustained effort, keeping on the part of AECID the good internal coordination in terms of regional policies that it has shown so far, **and fostering, at the bilateral level, an adequate flow of information, elaborating guidelines on those issues**

that should be supported bilaterally in order to strengthen and complete the regional level, so that synergies can be created and the maximum efficiency and efficacy are achieved.

- III.2. The experience so far also indicates that **those decisions concerning the entities that are not showing adequate solvency and capacity must be carefully weighed up**. This is the case of the **PPDU** and the feasibility studies whose support is envisaged by Spain. It is also necessary to take into account what we have already pointed out about the **ECOWADF**, whose functioning is blocked because it has been placed within the **EBID**, due to the latter's lack of operability. This could also affect the new fund for infrastructure and energy that is being created, if it is finally managed out of the EBID, as planned.
- III.3. **Spain has worked to improve coordination and harmonization with the TFP in agriculture through the Agriculture Working Group and has become a benchmark for the ECOWAS**. This key task to **maximise resources and avoid duplicities** must be continued and intensified. On one hand, fostering the effective functioning of the existing TFP **coordination** spaces and supporting their creation in the cases where those spaces do not exist. And on the other hand, gearing all efforts towards reducing the initiatives and assessing the pertinence of joint programming.
- III.4. The work done so far with the ECOWAS allows us to identify some **learned** lessons drawn from Spain's first programmes with this organization. Such are the cases of Project *Biawe* or the Fund for Migration and Development⁹⁵. From **Project Biawewe** can learn about the importance of assessing carefully the real implementation capacities of the chosen counterpart, always taking into account other potential alternatives that could let us implement the project effectively. It also reveals the risk of intervening in those matters for which Spain has not enough accumulated experience, which can lead to the wrong project design and budget.

The **Fund for Migration and Development** is a fine example of the risk of other agendas interfering with the development agenda and of the need to specify the lines of action and priorities to achieve results. The Fund could have been a good instrument to push the correct implementation of the ETLS – focusing on freedom of movement and intra-regional development which, on its own, reduces external migration – but the prioritized position that migration control took in the agendas (Spain's and the EU's) and the arguments drawn from it, determined the kind of proposals that were presented – many of them about fighting illegal immigration or human traffic. Also, the possibility of choosing between different priorities or action lines, led to the existence of a whole range of small disconnected projects that have not had the intended impact.

- III.5. Spain's support to the ECOWAS for **agriculture** has been in line with the regional priorities and has focused on improving the public capacities through different **capacity building** actions – a typical action from Spain, acknowledged by the ECOWAS. It has supported building-up a priority policy, strengthening capacities, improving donors' alignment and establishing the necessary institutional mechanisms to guarantee the

⁹⁵ For further information see Annexes II and III in the report's original version.

implementation of a key policy for regional development and for fighting poverty. This effort must be continued, to go on supporting the ECOWAS till this policy has been consolidated.

- III.6. Taking into account the region's situation and the persistent crises, the election of this focal sector has been most appropriate, because it will improve the population's capacity to face those crises (**resilience**) and will also bring in **Spain's added value on food security and the rights-based approach (Right to Food)**. Even though some actions related to RAIP's objective 2 might be needed in order **to advance towards rural development, this task could be supported by the actions on RE and infrastructure to support the agribusiness** (development corridors, storage and transformation facilities, accessible and sustainable energy,...) complementing other specialized actors (the FAO, USAID and others) and avoiding duplicities.
- III.7. To that end, regional initiatives such as **AGIR and, especially (given it is a project sponsored by the ECOWAS), Zero Hunger** should serve to introduce new topics in the agenda that will improve the ECOWAP (**resilience, food security, nutrition, climate change,...**), but avoiding duplicities that would waste the efforts carried out.
- III.8. To avoid clashes with the **food sovereignty logic arising from the ECOWAP**, any action geared at liberalising the regional market (such is the case of the EPA) must include some consistent development element and the necessary policy measures to guarantee alignment with this principle. Otherwise, given the power differences and the economic asymmetry between the blocks, the impacts for the region would be negative and could involve increasing the rates of poverty, inequality and food insecurity; issues all of them directly linked to the region's stability.
- III.9. **Spain's focus on building up the ECREEE's capacity can be considered fully accurate**, given the role the Centre is playing and its achievements and synergies, which reflect its work on RE and on energy efficiency. This support is equally essential for the future, as evidenced by the existing global and regional challenges related to sustainable human development and the effects of climate change.
- III.10. In terms of pertinence, one of the areas where most support is needed by the actors and development agencies is that of **coordination among them and the expansion of the RE in the rural areas**. The gradual reduction of technology costs and the success achieved by some projects, mostly photovoltaic ones, through mini-grids, point at the existence of great opportunities in the near future and a wide scope for action. The Spanish Agency for Development and International Cooperation can also rely on the experience of Spain's renewable energy industry, a world leader for wind power and photovoltaic energy, an added value acknowledged by the ECOWAS, which specifically requested Spain's support for RE. The rural small-scale RE projects and all projects related to rural development **in different sectors** (agriculture, micro and small enterprises) are also appropriate to establish PPP oriented to development results.
- III.11. Another possibility for the private sector to take part in projects that improve the living conditions of the most disadvantaged segments of society is the so-called "inclusive business", aimed at including these people in business processes and projects. UNDP

has an initiative for **Growing Inclusive Markets**⁹⁶ and collaborates with the **African Facility for Inclusive Markets**⁹⁷ to promote markets that benefit the poorest, with a development focus on agriculture, RE and tourism, with some benchmark projects related to RE in Mali and Senegal and to agribusiness in Ghana. The adoption of the inclusive market approach, supporting local businesses in the **NAIP and RAIP**, is another of the current challenges. Besides, this approach includes an **infrastructure** constituent, which is the case of the **development corridors** (some case studies related to agribusiness in Tanzania and Mozambique could be analysed in order to learn the good lessons and improve in terms of governance)⁹⁸.

III.12. **Connectivity and extension of the regional energy infrastructure** are also priority targets for the international development cooperation community given their direct impact on the living conditions of the local population. The projects must be aimed at achieving **an affordable, reliable and high-quality energy supply for the average citizen and the most vulnerable segments of society**. This could be then another potential line of action for Spain, taking the projects that are being developed by the WAPP as benchmark and with the possibility to include the corporate sector too. In this case, it would be advisable **to examine all the details in each project, its potential and feasibility**, taking into account all the different interests at play, the responsible behaviour of all involved parties and their potential impact in terms of development.

III.13. A general proposal that might be interesting to explore is to profit from the Spanish Agency's experience in different sectors and, **through a holistic approach, to try to link food security with infrastructure and RE in the rural areas**. Beyond implementing specific pilot projects, the target would be to foster the inclusion of these synergies in the ongoing policies – for instance, when designing and implementing the programmes foreseen by the NAIP and RAIP – supporting the adoption of institutional approaches that fully integrate an inter-sectorial view and effectively apply it in its actions. The region offers an enormous potential to develop projects that, based on **solidarity and balance**, allow for the **management of common resources**, preferably looking for **synergies among different policies** (agriculture, RE, infrastructure). For that purpose, it is important to orientate the efforts of Spain's Development Cooperation Policy towards reinforcing the insertion of the **regional approach in the ECOWAP (NAIP and RAIP)**, through those actions in which it takes part (regional reserve, social safety nets, ...) facilitating the connections among different actors from the ECOWAS member States, through its local offices whenever possible and by engaging the National Cells.

⁹⁶ http://www.undp.org/content/undp/es/home/ourwork/partners/private_sector/

⁹⁷ http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/partners/private_sector/AFIM.html

⁹⁸ http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Partnerships/Private%20Sector/Resume%20Analytique_Les%20roles%20et%20les%20opportunities%20pour%20le%20secteur%20prive%20de%20l%27industrie%20agroalimentaire.pdf



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